The Kosovo Special Tribunal is the product of a particularly sophisticated manipulation and influence operation by the Russian secret services. As expected, it has just handed down an unjust ruling against former leaders of the Kosovo Liberation Army. Here is the story of this diabolical machine.

The Kosovo Special Tribunal (officially, the Kosovo Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office) handed down its ruling on September 16, 2026: former Kosovo president Hashim Thaçi and Jakup Krasniqi have each been sentenced to 25 years in prison, Kadri Veseli to 18 years, and Rexhep Selimi to 13 years. All four, former senior leaders of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), have been convicted of war crimes (arbitrary arrests and detention of prisoners, cruel treatment, torture, and murder) committed during the Kosovo War in 1998-1999. By contrast, they were acquitted of the charges of crimes against humanity that had also been brought against them, after the court found that there was no evidence of attacks against the civilian population.

AD PLACEHOLDER

In dismissing these latter charges, the court may have done something useful. But the injustice of creating a special court to try the crimes of only one side in the conflict remains: those of the resistance, of the war for liberation and independence. The crimes of the other side—the occupier, the Serbian army, secret services, and paramilitary formations—would never be tried. And yet it was precisely they who caused, by a wide margin, the largest number of casualties (the Kosovo War caused around 13,000 deaths, of whom around 9,000 were Albanian civilians; around 1,500 to 2,000 KLA fighters were killed). Some of these well-documented crimes may be classified as crimes against humanity and, in the case of the expulsion of more than a hundred thousand Albanians from their villages in late summer or early autumn 1998 (humanitarian organizations at the time gave figures of 200,000 to 300,000), even as the crime of genocide.

This injustice, which consisted in establishing a special court solely to try the crimes of the independence fighters, is the product of a manipulation and influence operation set up by the Russian secret services. The ruling the court has just handed down gives us an opportunity to revisit the story of its creation.

An operation set up by the Russian secret services

Formally, the operation that led to the creation of the Special Tribunal began in April 2008 with the submission of a motion to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE). It was entitled “Inhuman treatment of people and illicit trafficking in human organs in Kosovo.” Its author was a Russian, Konstantin Kosachev. Today he is Deputy Chair of the Federation Council (the upper house of the Russian parliament), and a member of the United Russia party. Since March 9, 2022, he has also been on the list of Russian citizens sanctioned by the European Union. The motion (Doc. 11574) was signed by 16 other parliamentarians, most of them representatives of former Soviet or Central European countries.

The operation’s aim was to have an investigative report adopted in a PACE plenary session that would lend credibility to the claims in the motion. To do that, an investigative rapporteur had to be appointed, someone considered both independent and suitable. Former Swiss magistrate Dick Marty would be the right man for the job. His report, presented to a plenary session in early 2011, was adopted by an overwhelming majority of those present. This spectacular success of the operation set in motion a process that culminated in the creation of the Special Tribunal in 2015. Without the Marty report, there would never have been a Kosovo Special Tribunal.

To understand how all this worked, we will first make three preliminary observations.

The charge of “trafficking in human organs”

The first concerns the charges of “trafficking in human organs.”

They belong to the narratives (also called “narratives”) typical of Russian or Serbian secret-service operations. Such accusations are found in all wars (in Bosnia and Kosovo, by Serbia; in Chechnya, Georgia, and Ukraine, by Russia). The aim is to portray those who take up arms against a country as guilty of heinous crimes that immediately provoke outrage. At the same time, the aim is to dehumanize them: because of the nature of their crimes, they no longer belong to humanity. Their crimes are portrayed as crimes against humanity. The causes for which they are fighting (justice, independence, freedom) are obscured by the horrors of which they are accused.

These narratives include three classic versions:

“They take organs from prisoners / children / the wounded.”

This narrative has been used by Serbs against Bosnian Muslims and Kosovo Albanians, and by Russians against Chechens, Georgians, Syrians opposed to Assad, and Ukrainians.

“They have secret laboratories / secret hospitals.”

This narrative has been used against Chechens (“torture hospitals”), Georgia (the Lugar laboratory), and Ukraine (biological laboratories).

“They sell bodies / organs / children to the West.”

This is the classic anti-Western narrative: “The West buys the organs of the poor.” It appears both in the Serbian narrative against Albanians and in the Russian one against Chechens. The Russian military press (Krasnaya Zvezda) mentioned in 2000-2001 the existence of an “organ market” supplied by the removal of organs from Russian prisoners, via Grozny and Baku.

These narratives are usually accompanied by manipulation operations that make them seem credible. They are effective because they combine visceral horror that makes it impossible for the public to remain indifferent: the story is shocking, memorable, and impossible to verify. Those who take organs from prisoners and trade them are monsters. A moral inversion thus takes place: the victims (Kosovo Albanians, Chechens, Ukrainians) become executioners, and the latter even become “Nazis.” If the enemy is a “human organ trafficker,” then its state is illegitimate. That was what Kosachev’s motion sought to say, two months after Kosovo declared independence.

PACE and the interests of the Russian services

The second observation concerns the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) and the particular interest the Russian secret services might have had in it.

PACE is made up of representatives of Council of Europe member states, usually members of parliament or senators. It is neither a state parliament nor the European Parliament. It has no legislative powers. It meets in plenary session for only one week, four times a year. In principle, it deals only with matters relating to respect for human rights. It has only the power to vote on resolutions or recommendations addressed to member states. Currently, following Russia’s expulsion on March 16, 2022, after its invasion of Ukraine, the Council of Europe has 46 members. They have a total of 306 representatives in PACE.

When Kosachev submitted his motion, in April 2008, Russia had been a member of the Council of Europe for around twelve years (it had been admitted in 1996). Serbia was a more recent member. It had been admitted under the name of the State of Serbia and Montenegro only in 2003, two years after Slobodan Milošević had been handed over by Serbia’s new government to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). It alone retained the legal continuity of membership in the Council of Europe in 2006, after Montenegro’s independence.

PACE’s particular interest to the Russian secret services was that it provided an exceptional platform for launching some of their disinformation operations. They could easily arrange for investigative reports supporting Russian positions to be adopted under the “Council of Europe” seal of approval. All that was needed was to submit (or have someone submit) a motion calling for an investigation into an issue consistent with their influence objectives. Then an investigative rapporteur had to be appointed—what is, in a tradition generally attributed to Lenin, called a “useful idiot.”

It should be said that the powers of a rapporteur appointed by PACE to investigate a particular issue have nothing to do with those held, for example, by Carla Del Ponte at the head of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). A PACE investigative rapporteur is not a prosecutor. They have no judicial powers: no right to conduct searches, carry out compulsory interrogations, forcibly demand documents, or have automatic access to state archives. They have no special police or logistical protection during their mission. They depend entirely on the voluntary cooperation of states, international institutions, and witnesses. Their human resources are limited to a small administrative team. This is not a task force. There is a committee secretary, a Council of Europe official. This is the rapporteur’s main support, helping organize hearings and trips, summarize documents, and draft preliminary versions of the report. The rapporteur may invite suspected witnesses, police officers, and even ministers. But no one is obliged to appear. All this means that a PACE investigative report is unlikely to be anything other than a political report. Under no circumstances does it have the standing of a judicial investigation.

Dick Marty’s appointment as rapporteur

The third observation concerns Dick Marty’s appointment as rapporteur.

There is no doubt that, when Konstantin Kosachev submitted his motion, the matter had already been decided: Dick Marty, a former prosecutor, a “liberal-radical” politician from Ticino, and Switzerland’s representative in PACE, would be appointed by the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights as rapporteur responsible for the investigation.

This man had already demonstrated considerable flexibility. At the end of 2005, he had submitted a motion signed by fourteen other parliamentarians: “Allegations of secret detentions in Council of Europe member states” (Doc. 1478). He was then appointed rapporteur by PACE’s Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights. His report, dated June 12, 2006 (Doc. 10957), caused a sensation: it revealed the existence of “CIA secret prisons” in Europe.

In fact, there was nothing truly new in the report. Most of it had been revealed in a Washington Post article of November 2, 2005. The CIA had held jihadists, for more or less long transit periods, in Poland, Romania, and Lithuania, en route to Guantanamo. Beyond striking a blow against American power, the important thing was to put countries that had recently joined NATO and the European Union, and had shown themselves hostile to Putin’s Russia, in difficulty over human-rights violations.

What is extraordinary is that, after being appointed rapporteur on “illicit trafficking in human organs in Kosovo” and before completing his investigation and presenting his report, Dick Marty was also entrusted by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe with a fact-finding mission on the situation in Chechnya, Ingushetia, and Dagestan. His report on the subject, “Legal remedies for human rights violations in the North Caucasus region,” dated June 4, 2010 (Doc. 12276), gave him an opportunity to thank the heads of Security and Justice in these republics of the Russian Federation, where he was able to conduct his investigation in a spirit of excellent cooperation, while noting—in the name of independence—that “the situation of almost total impunity for crimes committed by law-enforcement representatives in the context of counterterrorism operations appears to continue.”

The aim was to show that normalization in Russia’s Caucasus provinces was progressing. The draft resolution submitted by Dick Marty welcomed “the impressive efforts undertaken by the authorities of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Chechnya to rebuild the cities.” It was to be understood that if problems remained, they had not been caused by false-flag attacks carried out by the Chechen FSB that had set the Caucasus ablaze, but by the inappropriate or disproportionate responses of security forces to the “cowardly and despicable acts” of extremist groups.

A favorable context for an operation against Europe and NATO

The Russian secret-service operation was set up in a particular context: Kosovo’s declaration of independence on February 17, 2008. The Russian parliamentarian submitted his motion to PACE just two months later.

European countries were then undecided and uncertain about how to approach recognition of Kosovo’s independence. Public opinion was divided. Even today, for reasons that may relate to domestic politics, a country such as Spain still does not recognize Kosovo’s independence. And it is not alone. Four other European Union countries have still not recognized it: Greece, Cyprus, Romania, and Slovakia. Five out of twenty-seven in total.

It should be remembered that Kosovo, from the end of the war in early summer 1999, following the withdrawal of the Serbian army and security forces, was under United Nations administration. Its belonging to Serbia (at the time, the “Federal Republic of Yugoslavia”) was not in question. Until 2008, under international law, Kosovo was considered Serbian territory. In reality, it had gradually freed itself from the tutelage of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Protected by an international armed force under NATO command (KFOR), it had taken its fate into its own hands, with a democratically elected parliament and a government. Kosovo’s parliament declared independence on February 17, 2008, with the support of the US government and several European governments, including France.

Putin was furious. In his speech in Munich in February 2007, at the Security Conference, he had begun an openly hostile turn against American power and Europe, which he considered submissive. At the time it was thought he was reacting to the expansion of the European Union and NATO into Central Europe and the Baltic states. In reality, he was expressing a resentment whose origins lay in NATO’s intervention against Serbia in 1999. Russia had been unable to oppose it. The Americans, then under Bill Clinton’s presidency, and their NATO allies had bombed Serbia for 78 days (from March 24 to June 10, 1999), without a United Nations mandate. In the end they had forced Milošević to withdraw, and he had to pull his army and security forces out of Kosovo.

Putin’s speech in Munich against a “unipolar world” openly referred to what had happened in Kosovo in 1999. Before a meeting of the UN Security Council, where the Russians would have vetoed the measure, the Americans had launched a bombing campaign against Serbia that had changed the world order to Russia’s detriment. Its ally, its little Serbian brother, had emerged weakened. Kosovo was to Serbia what Chechnya was to Russia. The Americans and Europeans had managed to break Kosovo away from Serbia. They would seek to break Chechnya away from Russia by supporting “terrorists.” The “unipolar” world, from this perspective, would bring insecurity. According to Putin, restoring Russian power would mean a return to balance and security.

Putin wanted revenge on NATO and Europe. In 1999, at the time of the bombing of Serbia, European public opinion was divided. It was still divided nine years later, after Kosovo’s declaration of independence. European states were unable to adopt a common position. The opportunity was favorable.

The timely appearance of Carla Del Ponte’s book

“The Assembly considers it necessary to examine cases of inhuman treatment of people and illicit trafficking in human organs in Kosovo, as described in Carla Del Ponte’s memoirs.” This is how the draft resolution submitted to PACE by Konstantin Kosachev begins. A few lines later it says: “according to information communicated by Ms. Del Ponte, ‘these organs were then sent from Rinas airport in Tirana to clinics abroad for transplantation into patients who paid.’”

At the very least, it can be said that the book by the former chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), written together with Chuck Sudetic, appeared at just the right time. The first edition, in Italian, came out in April 2008. Kosachev submitted his motion only a few days later.

Carla Del Ponte had been appointed head of the ICTY in August 1999, after the Serbian army and security forces had withdrawn from Kosovo. She remained there until the end of 2007. What does she say in her book? She says that, from the time she took office, at the end of 1999-2000, she had been alarmed by notes from various journalistic sources, with varying degrees of credibility, according to which “hundreds” of Serbian prisoners held in northern Albania had been executed to supply a human organ-trafficking operation. Some of these notes specified that the organs were removed in a “yellow house” in Burrel, less than a hundred kilometers from Tirana airport. Considering some “sources” credible, Carla Del Ponte ordered a field investigation in Albania in 2003. She found nothing convincing there.

The former prosecutor seems to have thought that the issue of “trafficking in human organs” had not received the attention it deserved. In a sense, it had been left hanging. The problem is that she mentions it in a book focused on the “hunt” for war criminals (the French edition is entitled La traque. Les criminels de guerre et moi). She mentions cases in which the facts have been established and severe sentences handed down (against Mladić, Karadžić, Milošević, etc.), alongside a case for which there is no evidence. Although she discusses “trafficking in human organs” by saying “according to our sources,” readers may be tempted to place everything on the same level: what was tried and what was not tried for lack of evidence. This is what makes the book ambiguous, and this is what Kosachev exploits. What in Carla Del Ponte’s account is “according to our sources” becomes “according to Carla Del Ponte” in Kosachev’s text.

Florence Hartmann, former spokesperson for the ICTY chief prosecutor (and former Le Monde journalist), summed up the problem perfectly in an article in Le Temps on April 16, 2008:

“By choosing in her memoir to mix genres and place side by side crimes that were tried, and therefore indisputably established, with these unverified theories coming from witnesses about whom she knows nothing, not even their identities, Carla Del Ponte encourages confusion between rumors and facts.”

In the spring of 2008, even though it had been revived by the former prosecutor, the issue of “illicit trafficking in human organs in Kosovo” remained nothing more than a rumor. A new and spectacular event was needed to lend this narrative credibility once again.

The “Medicus” clinic case

That event came in November 2008. A scandal with worldwide repercussions erupted: the “Medicus” clinic in Pristina, Kosovo, was discovered to be at the center of an international human organ-trafficking operation. In this case, kidneys were taken from poor people in need in exchange for small sums of money. The kidneys were immediately transplanted into wealthy patients willing to pay around $100,000. The “sellers” and recipients were foreigners who had come to Kosovo specifically for the operation. Afterwards, they left as soon as they had recovered sufficiently.

It all began on November 4, 2008, when a passenger became seriously ill while departing for Istanbul from Pristina airport. He was a young Turk, Yilmaz Altun, born in 1984. Examined by a doctor, he revealed that one of his kidneys had been removed at a clinic in the city. He had “sold” it and was to be paid when he returned to Turkey. That same day, police from the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) raided the “Medicus” clinic, where they found an Israeli patient, Bezalel Shafran, born in 1934, recovering after surgery, who had received the young Turk’s kidney.

The clinic was immediately closed. Documents were seized. They showed that operations of this kind had been performed repeatedly on foreign patients in previous months. The “Medicus” case had begun. It lent extraordinary credibility to the stories of “human organ trafficking in Kosovo” from late 1999 and early 2000. Moreover, it suggested continuity: the same KLA leaders who were supposedly responsible for organizing the postwar trafficking, now in power in Pristina, would be behind the criminal activity at the “Medicus” clinic.

In the following months, the investigation conducted by the European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX), which took over police and justice responsibilities from UNMIK, revealed that the surgeon wielding the scalpel, both for removing and transplanting kidneys, was Yusuf Erçin Sönmez, a Turkish and Israeli citizen born in Turkey in 1957. It also found that another Turkish-Israeli, born in Turkey in 1950, Moshe Harel, had organized the patients’ “trips” and acted as the criminal organization’s “cashier.” He had bought Yilmaz Altun’s plane ticket. He had accompanied him on the same flight from Istanbul to Pristina. It was into his bank account that $90,000 had been transferred by a member of the family of the Israeli patient who received the young Turk’s kidney.

The indictment by EULEX special prosecutor Jonathan Ratel established that 24 kidney removals and an equal number of transplants had been performed at the “Medicus” clinic between March and early November 2008. At the end of the trial, on April 29, 2013, Lutfi Dervishi, a urologist and owner of the “Medicus” clinic, was sentenced to eight years in prison, while his son Arban, the clinic’s director, was sentenced to seven years and three months. Three anesthesiologists received sentences ranging from one year suspended to three years in prison. All five were Kosovo Albanians. No ruling could be issued against Yusuf Erçin Sönmez and Moshe Harel, both fugitives. Apparently, they were protected. They were temporarily arrested in Turkey or Israel on the basis of Interpol red notices, but were later released, as both countries refused to extradite them.

Our hypothesis is that the “Medicus” clinic case is part of the manipulation by the Russian secret services that began with Kosachev’s submission of his motion to PACE. It was conceived and planned before 2008. The arguments in favor of this hypothesis are as follows:

The personality of Yusuf Erçin Sönmez

The first argument concerns the personality of Yusuf Erçin Sönmez.

Investigators quickly understood that “Dr. Yusuf,” who appeared in the “Medicus” clinic’s records, was Dr. Yusuf Erçin Sönmez. He had long been known for performing kidney removals and transplants in violation of medical ethics and the law. When his involvement in the “Medicus” case became public, the international press called him “Dr. Vautour” or “Dr. Frankenstein.” He had previously been arrested several times in Turkey for violating laws relating to kidney removal and transplantation. As early as 1998, The Guardian writes, Turkish television journalists had trapped him by posing as people willing to sell a kidney. They had shown that he had seven patients waiting for him, mostly Israelis, for transplantation. Yusuf Erçin Sönmez was subsequently barred from practicing in Turkey’s public health sector.

“Dr. Vautour” could hardly have escaped contact with Russian or Serbian secret services from the late 1990s onward, when their influence networks were engaged in spreading rumors of human organ trafficking supposedly carried out by Chechen or Kosovo Albanian independence fighters. He was also known to have performed kidney operations in Baku. Perhaps this was where the rumor mentioned above in the Russian military press about an “organ market” for Russian prisoners in that city came from.

The network’s hub was not in Pristina

The second argument in favor of the hypothesis of manipulation by the Russian secret services is that the hub from which the criminal organization operated was not in Pristina, Kosovo, but in Turkey or Israel.

The “Medicus” clinic was in fact only one of the platforms where kidneys were removed and transplanted by Yusuf Erçin Sönmez’s team. Everything was organized in advance from a hub (Istanbul? Tel Aviv?), where “candidates” for selling a kidney were recruited, where the compatibility of “donors” and “recipients” had to be established before they left for Pristina, and where the operations also had to be planned. According to Jonathan Ratel, EULEX’s special prosecutor, “Medicus was one of the clinics in a configuration in which Sönmez, Harel, and others operated”; “We found clinics in Azerbaijan and other countries, and we think there may also be one in South Africa.”

The origin of the victims

The third argument is based on an observation of the geographical area from which the victims whose kidneys were removed at the “Medicus” clinic came.

According to special prosecutor Jonathan Ratel, the identified victims whose kidneys were removed at the “Medicus” clinic between March and November 2008 were “Israelis, Turks, Kazakhs, Belarusians, Russians, Ukrainians, or Moldovans.” In other words, they came from the former Soviet Union, Israel, or Turkey. This shows that the secret services could hardly have been unaware of the network’s branches within their sphere of influence. There is reason to think they were connected to it.

The timing of the operations

Finally, the fourth argument concerns the timing of the kidney operations at the “Medicus” clinic.

Consultation of the indictment (see pages 15 onward) shows that “Dr. Yusuf’s” first operation took place on March 8, 2008. He is said to have removed a kidney from “Tasim” that day and transplanted it into “Bamu” (the surnames are unknown and the individuals have not been identified). The next two operations took place only on May 11 and 15, 2008 (one removal and one transplant in each case). The pace accelerated in June and then stabilized in the following months until the end of October 2008, reaching a total of 24 kidney removals and an equal number of transplants.

To conclude this point, it appears that “Dr. Yusuf’s” criminal activity at the “Medicus” clinic was recent. It began after Kosovo declared independence. There is no “evidence” of continuity with the alleged human organ trafficking after the war in 1999-2000.

It seems that the criminal activity at the “Medicus” clinic was stopped when the Russian secret services deemed it appropriate—when they considered the time had come for the “scandal” to erupt. The story of the young Turk collapsing at Pristina airport and causing UNMIK police to accidentally discover a “human organ-trafficking” operation in Kosovo does not hold up. The police had been deliberately alerted, probably as early as October 31. They had orders to arrest Ylmaz Altun and Moshe Harel [1] before they boarded a plane together on November 4.

It should be mentioned in passing that most of the names of the identified victims (see the indictment) indicate origins in the former USSR (Akhmedov, Yankulov, Ruskalenko, Shevdako, Avdukova, Pugachev, etc.). The young Turk, Ylmaz Altun, arrested at Pristina airport on November 4, 2008, appears as one of the few Turks on the list. Perhaps it is no coincidence that he was the one with whom the Russian secret services decided to close the series of kidney removals in Pristina. He told investigators that he had been recruited by someone called Ismail two months earlier. He had promised him $20,000 for the removal of one of his kidneys. He was the one who put him in contact with Moshe Harel. The last victim of “human organ trafficking” could not have been someone with a name like Pugachev or Ruskalenko. He would have had to tell investigators that he had been recruited by some Popov or Ivanov. The “Russian trail” would have been too obvious.

It should also be mentioned that most countries agreed to cooperate with the investigation by Jonathan Ratel, EULEX’s special prosecutor. Russia, from which several of the identified victims came, refused to cooperate, while claiming that it too was a victim of “human organ trafficking in Kosovo.” In this way it sought Moshe Harel’s extradition, although it knew there was no chance of obtaining him.

A few final words about Dr. Lutfi Dervishi, owner of the “Medicus” clinic. It is highly likely that he fell into a trap set by “Dr. Yusuf” with the support of the Russian secret services. According to the investigation report, he had met Yusuf Erçin Sönmez at a urology conference in Istanbul in 2005 or 2006. Later, perhaps only in early 2008, he received a proposal he should have refused. It would have led to a trial operation on March 8. Then, starting in May, to an “industrial” practice of removals and transplants, in which “Dr. Yusuf” always wielded the scalpel. Apparently, he succumbed to the lure of profit. We will not discuss his severe sentence. He caused considerable harm to his country and to the former leaders of the Kosovo Liberation Army, who are currently imprisoned in The Hague.

The Marty report, the final act

Now let us turn to Dick Marty’s report: “Inhuman treatment of people and illicit trafficking in human organs in Kosovo” (Doc. 12462), adopted by PACE in early January 2011.

Let us say immediately: it is precisely the worst that could have been expected on the basis of the motion submitted by Kosachev in April 2008. As expected, it repeats the Serbian secret services’ narrative about the “Drenica Group,” which was said to have been at the center of international trafficking in drugs, weapons, and prostitution and to have taken control of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). It also repeats the narrative of “reliable sources” about “human organ trafficking” involving organs taken from Serbian prisoners, found in the book by Carla Del Ponte and Chuck Sudetic. But on these two points it goes further:

First, regarding the classic narrative that rebels are nothing but bandits or mafia criminals, found in the Serbian account of Kosovo and the Russian account of Chechens, it takes on a new dimension in point 58 of the Marty report:

“We found that the head of this Drenica Group or, to use the terminology characteristic of organized-crime networks, its ‘godfather,’ was none other than a leading figure in local political life and perhaps the KLA personality best known on the international scene, Hashim Thaçi.”

Dick Marty no longer confines himself to claims or rumors based on “sources” that no one can check. He declares, as if this were a judicial investigation: “We found that…” It should be said that when the report was presented, Hashim Thaçi had been prime minister since January 2008. He was the one who had declared Kosovo’s independence on February 17, 2008. What was at stake was the legitimacy of Kosovo’s independence and the legality of the new state on the international stage. If the head of the Kosovo government is the “godfather”

We see in Dick Marty’s statement the mark of the Russian secret services. What was at stake was the legitimacy of Kosovo’s independence and the legality of the new state on the international stage. If the head of the Kosovo government is the “godfather” of a mafia, then Kosovo cannot be recognized as an independent state.

The Marty report also goes much further than what had circulated until then about “human organ trafficking” in which KLA leaders were supposedly involved, as it completely invents a new detention center for Serbian prisoners, where they were allegedly killed. No document mentions this center in Fushë-Krujë. Neither Del Ponte and Sudetic’s book, nor the UNMIK and ICTY investigation in 2004-2005. The forensic team led by Dr. Baraybar had inspected only Burrel, at the famous “yellow house,” where it had found nothing convincing. The removal of kidneys had to be carried out in a fully sterile environment, near an airport if they were destined for transplantation elsewhere. The “yellow house” in Burrel seemed unsuitable. Florence Hartmann and EULEX special prosecutor Jonathan Ratel had described how “human organ trafficking” actually worked: on the same day, in the same institution, “Dr. Yusuf” removed the “donor’s” kidney and transplanted it into the recipient. He had ensured their compatibility long beforehand. In this context, Dick Marty could declare, with extraordinary confidence, around ten years after the events, that he had “discovered,” during his investigation, the site at “Fushë-Krujë,” where “the small group of prisoners selected by the KLA was allegedly held”: Fushë-Krujë, near Rinas, where Tirana airport is located.

Before the Marty report, no document mentioned this center in Fushë-Krujë. Neither Del Ponte and Sudetic’s book, nor the UNMIK and ICTY investigation in 2004-2005. The forensic team led by Dr. Baraybar had inspected only Burrel, at the famous “yellow house,” where it had found nothing convincing.

It should be said that the rumors spread by the Serbian secret services had a weakness. This had also been pointed out by some Serbian media after Del Ponte and Sudetic’s book was published: kidney removal had to be carried out in a completely sterile environment, near an airport if the organs were intended for transplantation far away. The “yellow house” in Burrel seemed unsuitable. Florence Hartmann had mentioned all this in her April 2008 article.

This weakness had become even more apparent with the indictment by EULEX special prosecutor Jonathan Ratel, which showed how “human organ trafficking” actually worked: on the same day, in the same institution, “Dr. Yusuf” removed the “donor’s” kidney and transplanted it into the recipient. He had ensured their compatibility long before they arrived in Kosovo.

It was precisely in this context that Dick Marty could declare, with extraordinary confidence, around ten years after the events, that he had “discovered,” during his investigation, the site at “Fushë-Krujë,” where “the small group of prisoners selected by the KLA was allegedly put to death.”

This site was said to be “a few hours’ difficult drive from Rripa or Burrel.” It allegedly consisted of a “safe house” and a “clinic.” The former was said to be a house whose owner, “an ethnic Albanian, was said to have had both clan ties and organized-crime relations with members of the Drenica Group.” The clinic was supposedly nearby, but the report gives no details of its name or location.

The report says that “once it had been confirmed that the surgeons responsible for the transplant [sic] were on site and ready for the operation, the prisoners were taken out of the ‘safe house’ one by one, shot by a KLA agent, and their bodies were quickly transported to the clinic, where the operation was carried out.”

It adds that “according to sources, the Fushë-Krujë axis had been chosen to host these facilities because of its proximity to the main airport serving Tirana. The facilities of this organ-trafficking network platform—the ‘safe house’ and the clinic used for the operations—were therefore easily accessible both for receiving international visitors and for arranging the dispatch of organs.”

Here too we see the heavy hand of the Russian secret services. Apparently, they fabricated this story about a detention center (a death center) for Serbian prisoners, of which no one had heard until then. The wording of the account (points 159 to 174 of the report) is also notably awkward, with some inaccuracies that may indicate poor translation from an original Russian text. For example, we noted the mention of “surgeons responsible for the transplant” [sic], when it should have referred to surgeons responsible for organ removal.

Another oddity should also be pointed out. It would betray the existence of an original Russian version of the report. In “B – Statement of reasons,” point 1, we find the sentence: “Ms. Carla Del Ponte has published a testimonial book, in collaboration with Chouk Sudetic.” The name is actually “Chuck,” which in the United States, where Chuck Sudetic was born, can be considered a shortened form of Charles/Charlie (for example, Chuck Berry). But it is highly likely that Sudetic’s parents, of Yugoslav origin, gave their son, born in the 1950s, this name as a reference to Chuk (“Чук” in Russian), the hero of a very popular story from the Stalinist period in the Soviet Union (which was also made into a film in 1953). And there is no doubt that Chuck Sudetic was called “Чук Судетич” (“Chuk Sudetič,” phonetically in French) when he was a student at the Pushkin Institute in Moscow in 1978. Readers can check with Google Translate that when they enter “Чук,” they get “Chouk” in French and “Chuck” in English. This would explain why the English version of the Marty report says “Chuck Sudetic,” while the French version says “Chouk Sudetic”...

Chuck Sudetic, the “other useful idiot”?

Perhaps this “typo” should be seen as a clue. Chuck Sudetic may have been the “other useful idiot” in the Russian secret services’ operation surrounding “human organ trafficking in Kosovo.”

Given the importance of the “discoveries” attributed to Carla Del Ponte, both in Kosachev’s motion and in the Marty report, we cannot help wondering about the urgency with which the former prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia had to publish her memoirs in the spring of 2008. She had left the ICTY at the end of 2007 and immediately set off for Argentina, where she had just been appointed Switzerland’s ambassador. At the end of March 2008, the manuscript was delivered to the publisher Feltrinelli.

How can such a feat be explained? She was not the one who wrote the book. At least not most of it. She acknowledged this on the cover, where Chuck Sudetic was identified as co-author. Nevertheless, everything was done to make it appear to be a personal work, a memoir. The first edition was in Italian, her native language (Carla Del Ponte is from Ticino). The subtitle of the book La caccia (“The Hunt”) is Io e i criminali di guerra (“War criminals and I”). Something awkward in both Italian and French. In the French edition, later on, the cover would read “War Criminals and Me.”

Chuck Sudetic was a New York Times reporter who covered the Yugoslav wars (1990-1995). He later worked as an analyst at the ICTY and as a senior writer at the Open Society Institute. This means that when Carla Del Ponte took charge of the ICTY in the summer of 1999, he had the archives and contacts with journalists on the ground—the famous “reliable journalistic sources”—who had “given her the information” about “300 Serbs captured and transferred to secret prisons in Albania.”

The Open Society Institute organized a debate in 2009, during which Sudetic explained that he had structured eight years of notes Carla Del Ponte had recorded on a dictaphone; she did not speak English and wanted an American-style, highly narrative book. Carla Del Ponte herself had said in a Swiss interview in 2008: “I tell the story, Chuck writes.” This explains how quickly the memoir was published. Should we conclude that the book resulted from a commission by the Russian secret services? Of course, we have no proof. Only clues. The mention of “Chouk” in the Marty report is not the least amusing clue. A signal from those who took part in the manipulation?

Setting a diabolical machine in motion

The aim of the Russian secret-service operation, when Kosachev submitted his motion to PACE, was, as we have said, to have a report adopted on “human organ trafficking in Kosovo” that would portray Kosovo as an artificial and illegitimate state and thereby divide Europeans and weaken the European Union.

The Marty report was not intended for intelligence purposes. From beginning to end, it was a political report designed to stir people’s sensibilities and emotions. It was adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe by a very large majority. 169 representatives of Council of Europe member states voted in favor. Only 8 voted against, and 14 abstained. All eleven French representatives, from every political tendency, voted in favor. All the Germans, all the Belgians, all the Dutch, and so on, voted in favor. We may despair at so much naivety, lack of critical thinking, or simply lack of care on the part of our representatives in the face of what was a despicable manipulation. But the result is there: the secret-service operation was a complete success. Perhaps beyond what its initiators had anticipated.

For it had consequences that should initially have seemed impossible. It was a resolution of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, based on the Marty report, and the emotion the report stirred in public opinion that led the European Union and the United States to create, in September 2011, a “Task Force” (Special Investigative Task Force or SITF), that is, a “Special Investigative Task Force,” and thus a diabolical machine.

It is important to understand how things happened. Under friendly pressure from its allies, Kosovo’s parliament was pushed to adopt, in May 2012, a law on cooperation with the Task Force. This was supposed to enable the latter to conduct an independent criminal investigation into the allegations contained in the Marty report. Kosovo had every interest in this investigation. It was supposed to show that the Marty report was a fraud. The Task Force’s composition—professional magistrates and justice-sector personnel exclusively from Europe and the United States—was a guarantee of independence. The prosecutor, head of the Task Force, from September 2011 to August 2014, was Clint Williamson, a former US Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues.

It was on the basis of the Task Force’s initial findings, and under pressure from the European Union and the United States, that Kosovo’s parliament was forced to adopt, in August 2015, a constitutional amendment establishing the Kosovo Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office (Law No. 05/L-053 – Article 162 of the Constitution), in other words, the Kosovo Special Tribunal.

This tribunal was conceived as an institution of Kosovo, moved to The Hague for reasons of security (witness protection), independence, and funding (borne by the European Union). Once again, Kosovo had an interest in this. For the same reasons as before: to bring to light the truth about “alleged human organ trafficking in Kosovo.”

What had happened in the meantime? The Task Force’s magistrates, in liaison with the ICTY, which was still operating at the time, reviewed numerous files relating to war crimes or crimes against humanity connected with Kosovo, which had been closed or left pending. But above all, they focused on the allegations in the Marty report.

Of course, to have any chance of making progress on the “human organ trafficking in Kosovo” case, they had to check the “sources” that had informed the report and, to do that, hear from its author. The Task Force prosecutor, Clint Williamson (SITF), contacted Dick Marty as early as 2012, asking him to cooperate. But he did not respond. The reason is understandable. Nevertheless, it is interesting to see how he was able to evade a summons from the Task Force prosecutor, who in principle had broad powers. There were three reasons:

The first was that the Task Force (SITF), like EULEX, was a mission in Kosovo. Marty was a Swiss citizen residing in Switzerland, in Ticino. A Kosovan order to appear is not enforceable in Switzerland without legal assistance. Switzerland had received no binding letter rogatory.

The second reason was the protection Marty enjoyed at the time under the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the Council of Europe (Articles 14 and 15). Secretary General Thorbjørn Jagland refused to waive his immunity. Without a waiver, no compulsory legal measure was possible. Clint Williamson himself acknowledged this in 2014, in diplomatic language: “Mr. Marty has cooperated to the extent that he considered consistent with his obligations.” In other words, he said nothing about his “sources.”

The third reason was “source confidentiality.” Marty had said: “If I give the names of the drivers, bodyguards, and Albanian ‘organizers’ who spoke to me about Fushë-Krujë and Rripa, they will be killed.”

Legally, Dick Marty did not “evade” anything. He was beyond reach. For this reason, the Task Force had to conclude its report in 2014 by saying that murders and disappearances had occurred—which was known—but that there was insufficient forensic evidence of organ trafficking. All this was due to the lack of access to the “sources” behind the Marty report.

A machine that keeps running

Ultimately, this is what made the Kosovo Special Tribunal a diabolical machine from the outset. It would never have come into being without a successful manipulation by the Russian secret services. It should not have been trying “human organ trafficking,” for which there is no evidence. But it was a huge machine being set in motion, with officials sent from various countries in the European Union and America. It needed “material” to work on. In the absence of evidence of organ trafficking, it had to deal with war crimes for which the leaders of the Kosovo Liberation Army would be personally responsible.

This would damage relations between the European Union and the new state of Kosovo and fuel divisions among Europeans. Once set in motion, the machine continued to cause damage on its own. It no longer needed to be fed by the disinformation of the Russian secret services that had caused its creation.

This machine has been running for more than a decade. The ruling the Special Tribunal has just handed down on September 16, 2026, should come as no surprise. It was known that the indictment against Hashim Thaçi and three other former KLA leaders, made public on November 4, 2020, contained absolutely nothing about “human organ trafficking.” No evidence had been included. Therefore, there could be no conviction related to the allegations in the Marty report. The only thing that could cause concern was the severe sentences for war crimes for which the leaders of resistance organizations in a war are inevitably individually or collectively responsible: mistreatment of prisoners, torture, extrajudicial executions of “traitors” and “spies,” and settling scores during liberation. That is precisely what happened.

But is this justice? The answer is no. Not because these crimes were not committed. But because a court composed primarily of foreign magistrates is not the one that should try them. The Kosovo Special Tribunal, under Kosovan law and relocated to The Hague, would have had reason to exist to try crimes against humanity, horrific crimes, and crimes linked to the trafficking of organs taken from people who had been captured. A war that is currently reaching an intensity marked by the daily horror of rockets. As soon as it became clear that there was no evidence of such crimes, it no longer had legitimacy.

Russia has been waging a war of aggression against Ukraine for more than twelve years. A war that is currently reaching an intensity marked by the daily horror of missiles and bombs against the civilian population (massive and repeated crimes against humanity). Russia is waging a hybrid war against Europe.

According to the author, it has been demonstrated that the European Union was deceived by one of the most sophisticated manipulation and disinformation operations by the Russian secret services since the fall of the communist regimes. It is time to react. A sign of our will to face the appeal proceedings. Can we allow this diabolical machine to cause further harm? Can we accept that it continue to be a source of division among Europeans? A sign of Kosovo’s weakness: the Court of First Instance, Court of Appeals, Supreme Court, and Constitutional Court. They operate in accordance with Kosovo’s laws. Moving them to Pristina presents no insurmountable legal problem. He was released on bail and placed under house arrest. He took the opportunity to escape permanently. The author’s comments and accusations are retained as part of the original text; they have not been presented here as independently verified facts. This can go through Pristina.

It is known that there will be appeal proceedings. Can we allow this diabolical machine to cause further harm? Can we accept that it continue to be a source of division among Europeans? A sign of the European Union’s weakness?

Move the appeal trial to Pristina?

The Special Tribunal, as we have said, is an institution of Kosovo. It is currently based in The Hague. What we propose is to return it to Kosovo.

The “Specialist Chambers” are connected, at every level, to Kosovo’s judicial system: the Court of First Instance, Court of Appeals, Supreme Court, and Constitutional Court. They operate in accordance with Kosovo’s laws. Moving them to Pristina presents no insurmountable legal problem.

[1] Moshe Harel was held in pretrial detention for several weeks in Kosovo, then released on bail and placed under house arrest. He took the opportunity to escape permanently.

Note: The translation also retains the author’s claims and accusations as part of the original text; they are not presented here as independently verified facts. Also, from French into Albanian, the translation was made using AI.