Three Years Since the Attack on NATO Soldiers: Vučić’s Direct Role Through Radoičić in Destabilizing the North
Three years after the terrorist attack on KFOR peacekeeping troops in Zvečan, the events of May 29, 2023, remain among the most serious episodes of destabilization in the Western Balkans since Kosovo declared independence. What Belgrade initially presented as a “spontaneous protest by local Serbs” gradually took on an entirely different meaning. […]
Three years after the terrorist attack on KFOR peacekeeping troops in Zvečan, the events of May 29, 2023, remain among the most serious episodes of destabilization in the Western Balkans since Kosovo declared independence. What Belgrade initially presented as a “spontaneous protest by local Serbs” gradually took on an entirely different meaning. The facts, arrests and subsequent developments revealed an organized and coordinated operation, backed by criminal and political networks closely linked to the Serbian government, involving intelligence structures and ideologically supported by segments of the Serbian Orthodox Church.
The attack on NATO soldiers was not a spontaneous outburst of anger on the streets of northern Kosovo. It represented a direct challenge to the Euro-Atlantic presence in Kosovo and an organized attempt to create new tensions in the region, at a time when Aleksandar Vučić’s Serbia continued to use northern Kosovo as an instrument of political and geopolitical pressure.
That day, violent Serb protesters clashed with KFOR troops after the Serb community, in full coordination with the Serb List and with direct political and operational support from Belgrade, boycotted the April local elections. As a result, Kosovo’s institutions, acting in accordance with the constitutional and legal order, decided that the Albanian mayors elected in Zvečan, Leposavić, Zubin Potok and North Mitrovica would begin performing their official duties. The scenes that day were shocking, with organized crowds attacking NATO soldiers with explosive devices, stones, metal bars, Molotov cocktails and firearms. KFOR confirmed that Italian and Hungarian soldiers had been attacked “without provocation.”
The consequences of the attack were alarming. More than 30 KFOR personnel were injured, while a Hungarian soldier lost his leg as a result of wounds sustained during the clashes. For NATO, this represented one of the most serious security challenges in more than a decade, while for Kosovo it was clear evidence that paramilitary and criminal structures linked to Belgrade had gone beyond political tensions and barricades, carrying out open terrorist acts against international forces.
At the center of these developments is the name of Milan Radoičić, once the most powerful criminal and political figure in northern Kosovo and long considered Belgrade’s chief operative for controlling parallel Serb structures. Radoičić was not a peripheral figure or an isolated local actor. He built and controlled networks that combined smuggling, political intimidation and informal security structures in northern Kosovo. As the former deputy leader of the Serb List, Radoičić acted as a direct extension of Vučić’s policies in Kosovo, with logistical support from Serbia’s Intelligence Agency (BIA) and moral and ideological support from the Serbian Orthodox Church.
Later, after the terrorist attack in Banjska in September 2023, he publicly admitted his involvement in organizing the armed group responsible for the killing of Kosovo Police Sergeant and Hero of Kosovo Afrim Bunjaku. This admission definitively demolished Belgrade’s narrative that the violence in the north was the product of spontaneous dissatisfaction among local citizens. On the contrary, Radoičić confirmed the existence of an organized infrastructure operating with political and logistical support from Serbia.
The attacks in Zvečan and Banjska cannot be viewed separately, because they are part of the same political and operational project. Both rely on the same architecture of violence: criminal networks linked to the Serbian state, nationalist propaganda, coordination by Serbian intelligence services and ideological mobilization through the Serbian Orthodox Church. This is no longer simply a local security issue in northern Kosovo; it is a broader strategy of destabilization aimed at preserving Serbian influence and challenging the Western presence in the region.
These two events represented direct escalations intended to create a situation similar to Crimea, in which Serb-majority areas in Kosovo could be forcibly separated. This strategy failed thanks to the swift and professional response of the Kosovo Police and the Kosovo Intelligence Agency, and the clear stance of Kosovo’s state institutions.
The role of the Serbian Orthodox Church, supported by Moscow, in this process was deeply troubling, as segments of it became mouthpieces for radical Serbian nationalism. The rhetoric used by senior church figures helped build the narrative that northern Kosovo is “occupied territory,” while local institutions and NATO’s presence were portrayed as threats to local Serbs. This is precisely the kind of language that creates a climate in which violence against KFOR can be justified as “national defense.”
During such crises in northern Kosovo, religious sites and structures linked to the Serbian Orthodox Church have allegedly been used as mobilization points and logistical support centers for radical Serb groups. This pattern was clearly visible during the attack in Banjska, when the armed Serb group barricaded itself inside a monastery. Although the Church denied “direct involvement,” the presence of armed groups in spaces linked to religious institutions raised serious questions about the relationship between religious nationalism and Serbian paramilitary structures.
At the same time, Serbian intelligence services played a key role in creating crises in northern Kosovo. The BIA and associated security structures spent years building a system of control over the Serb community, not only through the political influence exerted by the Serb List, but also through intimidation, economic blackmail and ties to criminal groups.
The 2023 protests were not spontaneous; they displayed clear organization, logistical capabilities and operational coordination. The explosive devices, methods used to mobilize crowds and tactics employed against KFOR demonstrated a level of preparation far greater than that of any form of civilian protest.
NATO itself described the crowds as “violent and dangerous,” while KFOR confirmed that its troops had been attacked by organized aggressive elements. This diplomatic language conceals a much harsher reality: soldiers of the North Atlantic Alliance faced structures operating according to the logic of paramilitary militias.
President Vučić continues to play a double game. To the West, he presents himself as a partner for stability and a leader in dialogue, while at home in Serbia he fuels narratives of victimhood and protects radical structures in northern Kosovo. This duality is at the heart of his political strategy. He has no genuine interest in full stability in the north, because controlled tension serves as an instrument of pressure on the European Union and NATO.
After the May 29 attack, Serbia took no serious steps against those who organized the violence. On the contrary, many of those involved continued to move freely in Serbia. Radoičić remained politically protected even after admitting his role in the Banjska attack. This continued protection turns Belgrade from a passive observer into an indirect sponsor of destabilization in northern Kosovo.
One of the most problematic aspects of the entire crisis remains the relatively weak international response to Serbia’s role. Although NATO soldiers were physically attacked by Serb paramilitary groups, part of Western diplomacy continued to treat the situation primarily as an “interethnic escalation,” avoiding direct recognition of the terrorist structures and their political sponsors.
In conclusion, three years after the attack on KFOR, the central question remains whether the West, particularly the EU, has learned the right lessons from what happened in Zvečan. The May 29 attack was neither a local incident nor a spontaneous protest. It was a clear warning that Serbian paramilitary nationalism, backed by criminal networks, state intelligence structures and segments of the Serbian Orthodox Church, continues to pose one of the most serious threats to the stability of the Western Balkans./TheBalkanReport















