Imer Mushkolaj

The cases involving arrests, indictments and convictions of people suspected of cooperating with Serbian intelligence services should prompt institutions and society to think seriously not only about the individuals who have been exposed as spies, but above all about the system that enabled some of them to live freely for years, gain access to institutions, the media and public life, and, in certain cases, even to state structures. This is the greatest paradox.

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A young state that has experienced war and then Serbia’s direct intervention cannot treat counterintelligence as a secondary matter. On the contrary. For Kosovo, counterintelligence is part of the state’s survival. If a person linked to a foreign service manages to infiltrate an institution, build a network of contacts, gain trust and obtain information, the damage cannot be measured only by the information they may have passed on. The damage is far greater, creating a window through which another state can see from within how Kosovo operates. Serbia has a strong interest in this.

Belgrade has not abandoned its aim of keeping Kosovo under political and security pressure. For this reason, the activity of Serbian intelligence structures cannot be viewed only through the classic model of espionage. Today, information can be used for political influence, blackmail, propaganda, destabilization, manipulation of public opinion or to identify institutions’ weaknesses.

The recent indictment of Fatmir Sheholli, whom Kosovo’s Special Prosecution accuses of espionage and blackmail and claims was recruited by Serbia’s BIA, is just one example of how complicated this issue can be. In this case, the most important question is: how is it possible that people suspected of ties to foreign services have had room to operate for so long? This issue becomes even more serious when we recall that there have been cases in which people suspected of collaborating with Serbia have been part of institutions or had access to circles where information matters. For instance, a former Kosovo Police official was convicted of espionage. This shows that the problem is not only how many agents may have been uncovered. The problem is how many may not have been uncovered.

No one can know today how many other people may have secret ties to foreign services. Any number would be speculation, so a distinction must be made between reasonable alarm and paranoia.

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Kosovo does not need a society in which everyone is suspected of being a spy, but institutions that know how to identify spies through evidence. This requires strengthening the Kosovo Intelligence Agency, the Police, the Special Prosecution and other security institutions. It requires much more serious vetting of people working in sensitive positions. It requires ongoing oversight of access to classified information, not just a formal check when someone is hired. But it also requires something else: professionalism.

Counterintelligence cannot be a political weapon. If every political opponent, critical journalist, activist or citizen with a different opinion can be labeled a “Serbian agent,” then the fight against espionage becomes a tool for frightening society. This would harm Kosovo just as much as espionage itself.

Institutions must work with evidence, not perceptions. With investigations, not revenge. With professionalism, not propaganda. At the same time, there must be a serious review of people’s access to the state’s most sensitive institutions. Who has access to classified information? Who can obtain it? Who can copy it? Who can pass it outside the institution? Who checks whether someone is using their position to establish channels of communication with a foreign service?

These are not questions posed by a paranoid state. They are questions posed by a normal state. A state is not strong only when it arrests an agent. It is strong when it uncovers one before they cause damage.

Therefore, the latest arrests and indictments should serve as a wake-up call for Kosovo’s institutions, not as a reason to declare everyone who thinks differently an enemy.

Serbia tries to harm Kosovo through politics, diplomacy, propaganda or its security structures. But Kosovo’s greatest weakness would be if these efforts found people within society willing to serve them.

How many other spies does Serbia have in Kosovo? In institutions. In politics. In business. In the media. In society. There may be many. There may be few. There may be none in some of these sectors. But a serious state does not wait to find out after the damage has been done. A serious state builds mechanisms to uncover a threat before it becomes a catastrophe. Kosovo has won the war, declared independence and built institutions. But a state is not protected only at the border. Perhaps this is the battle Kosovo still has not fully understood.