The Blocker Has a Name: Albin Kurti
Unconstitutionality is at risk of becoming the norm. Violating deadlines is being treated as part of the political game. Institutional deadlock is being accepted as something ordinary. The reasons for dysfunction are being replaced one after another. Albin Kurti is using the deadlock as a political tool. This is an extremely dangerous precedent.
Imer Mushkolaj
This is no longer just a matter of an assembly that cannot be constituted, nor an ordinary political disagreement between parties. What is happening in Kosovo has taken on much more serious dimensions: a political party is using its parliamentary majority as a means of holding the functioning of state institutions hostage.
The Vetëvendosje Movement, the largest party in the Assembly and the force that has received the greatest trust from citizens, is using its result to block the Assembly instead of using it to make the Assembly function. The names of the opposition candidates for deputy speakers of the Assembly have now become an obstacle; tomorrow, another reason may be found, and the day after, yet another. This is the most troubling part of this story: when a political entity decides that the constitution and institutional rules apply only when they suit its own interests, the state enters a dangerous zone.
The issue is not whether Vetëvendosje likes or dislikes a candidate for deputy speaker. Nor is it whether someone from the LDK or PDK is politically acceptable to Vetëvendosje. Candidates can be criticized, politically opposed, and rejected if there are constitutional or legal grounds for doing so. But the Assembly cannot be held hostage to the will of a party seeking to dictate who should hold a position belonging to another parliamentary group. This is not called parliamentary democracy. It is called a blockade.
And when the blockade is repeated, when a new reason is found for every step, when minor technical or political obstacles are turned into major state issues, then it becomes difficult to believe that it is all merely accidental.
Clearly, the blockade is being used as a political tool. The aim is not only to prevent the LDK and PDK from electing their candidates. The aim is to buy time. The longer the crisis lasts, the closer new elections come. And elections, of course, are not only a constitutional matter. They are also a matter of political calculation.
In politics, timing matters. A party that believes a certain election date will give it an advantage has an interest in ensuring that date arrives. If that requires delaying the constitution of the Assembly, postponing the formation of institutions, and keeping the country and its citizens waiting, then we are dealing with a calculation that places party interests above the interests of the state.
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Kosovo cannot be held hostage to one party’s agenda. What makes the situation even more serious is the ongoing defiance of the constitutional order. The Constitution is not a recommendation. Constitutional deadlines are not suggestions. Institutions cannot be formed when it suits the majority and delayed when the majority wants to buy time. This is the fundamental problem.
If a party that has won the most votes interprets its victory as a mandate to do whatever it wants, then we have misunderstood democracy. Winning an election does not give you the right to disregard rules that apply to everyone. On the contrary, the greater the political responsibility, the greater the responsibility to respect the Constitution should be. But in Kosovo, the opposite is happening.
Unconstitutionality is at risk of becoming the norm. Violating deadlines is being treated as part of the political game. Institutional deadlock is being accepted as something ordinary. The reasons for dysfunction are being replaced one after another, while the state continues to wait. This is an extremely dangerous precedent.
Today it may be the deputy speaker of the Assembly, tomorrow the speaker, the day after the government, and later the president. If the belief takes hold that a political majority can bypass the rules whenever they stand in the way of pursuing its own interests, then we no longer have a functioning constitutional order. We have a system in which the rules change according to whoever holds power at the moment. And that is the shortest path to state capture.
Kosovo has paid a great deal to build a democratic state. It has invested years, energy, and sacrifices to create institutions that function under the law, not according to the will of individuals or parties. It is therefore absurd that today, precisely from the party that claims to be the state’s greatest defender, should come an approach that weakens the state itself. The state is not strengthened by blocking the Assembly, inventing new reasons for postponement, or using the Constitution as a selective instrument. The state is not strengthened by placing party interests above institutions.
Kosovo needs functioning institutions, not an endless crisis managed according to electoral calculations. It needs an Assembly that works, a government that takes responsibility, and a constitutional order that is respected. Otherwise, the political crisis turns into a state crisis.
A state where the law is respected only when it suits those in power is not strong. A state where the Constitution can be bypassed for party interests is not functional. A state where institutions are held hostage while waiting for a more suitable election date is on the wrong path. This is no longer a fight over a post in the Assembly, but a fight over who has the final say: the Constitution or the party. If the answer becomes the party, then the problem is no longer only Vetëvendosje. The problem is the state of Kosovo. A state that normalizes the violation of its own rules risks sooner or later becoming something no one would accept: a failed state. Not because it has no constitution, but because those who should respect it do not heed it.















