The unrest of March 17–18, 2004, was initiated by Serbia, which manipulated mass anger to create a new situation in Kosovo involving its cantonization. September 16, 2026, may have been a second opportunity to create a “March 2,” aimed at weakening, dividing and abolishing the state of Kosovo by tarnishing the KLA’s war, the state of Kosovo and Albanians, portraying them as actors with intentions against the Serbian community.

 

Written by: Dr. Gurakuç Kuçi – professor and researcher

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Plans to divide and dismantle the state of Kosovo appear to have been calculated with the expected public outrage following the announcement of the sentences for the KLA leaders in The Hague. An impulsive reaction, orchestrated incitement and emotional manipulation following the model of the March 2004 unrest would be the most fatal scenario for Kosovo.

You can read more here about Serbia’s aims in the March 2004 unrest.

Serbia has long been working to weaken Kosovo’s sovereignty and portray Serbs in Kosovo as victims of “ethnic cleansing,” and has been intensifying its efforts.

Given that BIA spies have been caught in Kosovo, and that they had plans to foment interethnic unrest by provoking the situation, after which the other side would “add fuel to the fire,” September 16—the day the verdict against the KLA’s former leaders would have been handed down—may have been the day intended for a “March 2” to unfold.

The danger was that the anger generated in Kosovo could be exploited to provoke an interethnic incident: protests diverted toward Serb-majority areas or Orthodox Church buildings, clashes, casualties, and then the immediate internationalization of the crisis. Such a scenario would shift the debate within hours from the injustice in The Hague to the question of whether Kosovo is capable of protecting Serbs and Orthodox heritage. This is precisely the kind of political consequence that, after March 2004, fueled plans for ethnic decentralization, autonomy, partition and, ultimately, the dismantling of the state of Kosovo.

 

Vučić and information before the verdict

As early as September 3, thirteen days before the verdict, Aleksandar Vučić declared that he was concerned about protests in Kosovo and claimed that violence was being threatened if Hashim Thaqi was not released.

Nine days later, something even more unusual happened. On September 12, Vučić revealed that Serbian intelligence services had initially told him Thaçi would receive a sentence that would roughly amount to no more than the time he had spent in pretrial detention. But later, referring to his contacts in Paris with European and world leaders, he said he had received “other indications” that a severe sentence might be handed down. Vučić’s visit to Paris and his meeting with Emmanuel Macron on September 9 are also documented by the Presidency of Serbia.

Four days later, Thaçi and Jakup Krasniqi were each sentenced to 25 years in prison, Kadri Veseli to 18 years, and Rexhep Selimi to 13 years in prison.

This raises a question that must not be overlooked: what information about a verdict that had not yet been announced was circulating at political and diplomatic levels?

From the Marty Report to EULEX’s history

The origins of the process also warrant revisiting. The motion of April 15, 2008, which later led to Dick Marty’s report, was initiated by Russia’s Konstantin Kosachev; among its signatories were Serbia’s Miloš Aligrudić and Russia’s Mikhail Margelov, alongside parliamentarians from other countries.

Serbia and Russia subsequently continued to promote the issue internationally. In April 2011, Serbia called for the creation of an investigative mechanism under the authority of the Security Council, while on June 23 Russia circulated, on Serbia’s behalf, a draft resolution to establish such a mechanism. Russia continued to support Serbia’s request in later discussions at the Security Council.

Meanwhile, Presiding Judge Charles Smith had previously been part of EULEX’s senior judicial structure. According to the official biography published by the Kosovo Specialist Chambers, he served as an EULEX judge from 2010 to 2013, as a member of the Supreme Court of Kosovo, and later as vice-president and president of the EULEX Assembly of Judges.

In 2021, the defense of the KLA’s former leaders, in another case before the Specialist Chambers, requested his recusal, referring to allegations by former EULEX judge Malcolm Simmons and email correspondence concerning Smith’s conduct during his time at EULEX. The official decision on the request to recuse Smith was rejected, but confirms that the materials and allegations had been submitted in the proceedings.

These elements form a convergence that merits investigation: the political origins of the case, Serbia and Russia’s long-term interest, the Serbian president’s advance information, the presiding judge’s institutional background, and a context in which the West is simultaneously seeking to keep Serbia as far as possible from Russia’s orbit. In 2026, Serbia has “continued” on its path toward the EU while also taking steps to “reduce” its energy dependence on Russia and secure supplies through European mechanisms.

 

A new “March 2004” and the interest behind the verdict

The most serious question, however, is what comes after the first-instance verdict.

If the anger in Kosovo remains a political protest, we have a crisis of justice and trust. But if that anger turns into violence against Serbs or Orthodox churches, then we have something else: a security crisis that could be used to revive the argument that Kosovo cannot function as a multiethnic society and that another solution is needed.

Kosovo has seen this pattern once before, in March 2004. Therefore, the question today is not only what The Hague decided.

The question is what scenarios may have been calculated around the Specialist Chambers’ verdict. If the plans have already failed—and apparently they have—then the appeal verdict could acquit the KLA’s former leaders. However, it remains our duty as a state and society to ensure these plans remain thwarted. In this regard, consideration should be given to ways for the Kosovo Bar Association to support the defense in The Hague through a specialized team to analyze the verdict, identify legal and factual errors, research case law, review new evidence and simulate appeal hearings. It could also seek amicus curiae status, since Rule 67 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence allows an organization or individual to request permission, or to be invited by the panel, to submit observations as amicus curiae, while the defense team in The Hague retains procedural control.