There is something strange about the way the Democratic League of Kosovo continues to see itself. Within the party, the belief that it is a “big party” still prevails. As if political greatness were an inherited title, a possession that can never be lost, regardless of election results.

But politics recognizes no permanent greatness. Size is measured in votes, public trust, influence, and the ability to win elections. The reality for the LDK is far more bitter than the myth.

AD PLACEHOLDER

This party has not come first in parliamentary elections in Kosovo for more than two decades. It was once the dominant party on the political scene and was associated with the name of Ibrahim Rugova and the idea of a free and democratic Kosovo. Today it is the third party, and its election result is an alarm bell.

The biggest problem is that instead of this result prompting deep reflection, the LDK continues to act as if the problem lies somewhere outside the party. As if voters had failed to understand its platform. As if its glorious history were enough to guarantee its future. Naturally, that is not enough.

The LDK is now facing a crisis that is not only electoral. It is a crisis of identity, leadership, and trust. Internal divisions are becoming increasingly visible, while debate over the party’s direction is taking place in an atmosphere of distrust and accusations. At the center of this crisis is Lumir Abdixhiku.

He took the helm of the party in March 2021. Five years is enough time to show whether a leader has the ability to revive a party, expand its base, and turn it into a governing force. The results, however, give no reason for complacency.

Instead of growing, the LDK remained in third place. What went wrong?

Abdixhiku built his team, promoted new figures, and tried to shape an LDK more aligned with his political profile. But in the process, many veteran figures with a history, influence, and electoral weight left, were sidelined, or were excluded from decision-making.

Renewing a party is not a problem. On the contrary, every party that wants to survive must renew itself. The problem arises when renewal turns into exclusion. When young people are used to replace the old, instead of building a bridge between generations. When experience is seen as an obstacle rather than political capital. When critics are treated as enemies rather than people who may hold a different opinion. This is precisely what many within the LDK see as arrogance and overbearing behavior on the part of the new leadership.

A democratic party cannot function according to the logic of “either you are with me, or you are against me.” All the less so a party that claims to be the heir to a democratic tradition. The LDK needs debate, not silence. It needs internal competition, not uniformity. It needs figures who can challenge the party leader without being considered a problem for the party.

Because a party that pushes people out for thinking differently does not become stronger in the end. It becomes smaller. And that is the LDK’s greatest fear today.

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If the crisis continues, if divisions deepen, and if the leadership fails to create a genuine process of reconciliation within the party, new elections could find the LDK even weaker. Not only with fewer members of parliament, but with an increasingly aging, less enthusiastic electorate, ever more ready to seek another alternative. In politics, voters have no obligation to remain loyal to a party’s history. They can leave. And when they do, they do not come back just because the party reminds them it was once great.

This is the myth the LDK must break before it is too late: the myth that it is still automatically one of Kosovo’s two main parties. It is not. Today it is third. And if nothing serious changes, it could become even smaller.

Perhaps the LDK’s biggest problem is not that it has lost elections. Parties lose elections. The problem is that it still seems not to have fully understood why it is losing them. As long as there are excuses instead of honest analysis, divisions instead of unity, discipline instead of debate, and history is used as a substitute for vision, the LDK will continue to live between memories of its former greatness and fear of an increasingly uncertain future.

Reconfirming the party leader does not solve this problem either. Abdixhiku once again received the delegates’ confidence, but this cannot automatically be interpreted as a resolution of the crisis.

On the contrary, the responsibility is now even greater. After five years, he can no longer ask for more time to prove himself. Now he must deliver results.

The LDK still has a chance to return. It has history, a structure, experienced people, and a significant part of the electorate that still sees it as its political home. But nothing is permanent. If the LDK continues to believe it is great simply because it once was, it risks losing even what it has left. And then the question will no longer be why the LDK is not returning to first place, but whether it will remain great only in people’s memories. Its future today is far from certain.