The decision of the Kosovo Specialist Chambers in The Hague against Hashim Thaçi, Kadri Veseli, Rexhep Selimi and Jakup Krasniqi, on September 16, 2026, found the four accused guilty of war crimes (arbitrary detention or arrest, cruel treatment, torture and murder), sentencing Thaçi and Krasniqi to 25 years in prison each, Veseli to 18 years and Selimi to 13 years. The Trial Panel dismissed the charges of crimes against humanity against the four accused. (Koha.net, 16/09/2026). But immediately after the verdict was announced, Serbia began exploiting it for propaganda purposes, shifting it into a broader political discourse. Serbian authorities and pro-government media presented it exclusively as “confirmation of their interpretation of the KLA and the Kosovo war.”

The ruling as “proof” against Kosovo

AD PLACEHOLDER

Serbian Interior Minister Ivica Dačić called it “confirmation” of what Serbia had been saying for more than two decades, claiming that the ruling had refuted the narrative of the KLA as a liberation force and its war as a “just war of liberation” (RTS, 16/09/2026). This approach is not directly related to the ruling, but is part of a structured communications strategy in Serbia, where victimhood occupies a central place in interpretations of the Kosovo war and NATO intervention. Through this strategy, the “suffering” of Serbs is kept at the center of public memory and discourse, while the circumstances that led to the armed struggle for freedom are not mentioned at all: systematic repression of Kosovo Albanians, killings and massacres of the civilian population, as well as the mass expulsion of Albanians during the war (HRW, 2001). Thus, the Hague ruling has arrived in a political and media landscape already primed to appropriate it as “proof” of a narrative constructed decades earlier. In other words, this is a shift from “justice” to propaganda: a judgment that, according to the Trial Panel, concerns “individual criminal responsibility” is interpreted in Serbian political discourse as “proof” of the character of the KLA and its war for freedom. Reporting by media close to the authorities in Serbia followed the same line. The SRNA news agency titled its report “81 years in prison for leaders of the terrorist KLA,” labeling the KLA “terrorist” right in the headline, while RTRS published a reaction from the Minister of Justice of Republika Srpska, Goran Selak, under the headline “Release from charges of crimes against humanity is an insult to the victims”. In another SRNA report, Selak’s position was summed up in the headline “Verdict against leaders of the terrorist KLA – humiliation of Serbian victims” (SRNA, 16/09/2026; RTRS, 16/09/2026).

This is nothing more and nothing less than a continuation of the already familiar manipulation of historical memory and political narrative in Serbia: “Serbia as the victim, Serbs as victims, Albanians as aggressors, and the West as the actor that legitimized the aggressor.” The Hague ruling is inserted into this framework as a new element of authority. The victimhood narrative itself is not new; rather, it is the attempt to give it a new stamp of international legal approval. Serbia is using the guilty verdict against KLA leaders as “international certification” of its strategic narratives. It is precisely for this reason that Dačić’s statement has a political dimension beyond its direct content, because, according to him, the judgment had refuted the very idea of a “war of liberation.” Such rhetorical maneuvering seeks to instrumentalize the ruling by extending the narrative beyond the war of liberation to the state of Kosovo, which was the result of that war and NATO’s military intervention to stop ethnic cleansing in Kosovo (NATO, Kosovo: The Real Story, 06/04/2000).

Research on the politics of memory in Serbia also provides evidence for such an interpretation. In her article “Why and how victimhood matters? Between strategic ontological narratives and intersectional injustice in contemporary Serbia”, Jessie Barton Hronešová argues that Serbian political elites have strategically used narratives of “victimhood” and “historical injustice” to support discourses about the past and justify the political orientations of the present. According to the author, under Aleksandar Vučić’s prolonged rule, victimhood has become a centralized framework for political communication, articulated through his personal appearances and pro-regime media (Hronešová, 2025:533-538). In the case of Kosovo, this narrative seeks to portray Kosovo Serbs as a “threatened” community and Serbia as the subject of ongoing international “injustices.” Therefore, the instrumentalization of the ruling should be analyzed as a continuation of Serbia’s strategic communications in the service of producing, consolidating and politically promoting narratives about the past and collective memory (Fetoshi, 2026). Research on Serbian nationalist discourse has long shown that the media play an important role in reproducing the image of Serbs as “victims” of Kosovo Albanians. Erjavec and Volčič (2007), in their analysis of Serbian media, found that the dominant nationalist discourse portrayed Serbs as victims of Albanians. According to the authors, this framework relied on appropriating and adapting international discourses on “crime” and the “war on terror,” which, when adapted to the Serbian political context, served to portray Albanians as a source of “threat” and legitimize the nationalist interpretation of the conflict (Erjavec & Volčič, 2007:67-68; Erjavec & Volčič, 2007:123-124). Thus, the Hague ruling gives Serbia room to instrumentalize it in service of an already consolidated political narrative about Kosovo, “cloaking” it in legal authority. This is highly useful for Serbian propaganda: a narrative initially produced by politics and the media is now being presented as endorsed by an international court. There is no doubt that the Serbian authorities and controlled media are recontextualizing and integrating it into their communications strategy, lending their interpretation the weight of the international character of the judicial process.

According to this strategy, the Hague ruling can be projected as a new part of the same framework. The 1999 bombings, “Serbian victims,” “the expulsion of Serbs after the war,” “KLA crimes” and the Hague ruling are placed within a single narrative framework. The intended conclusion is clear: Serbia was the “victim,” Albanians were the “aggressor,” and the international intervention was “unjust” toward Serbia. Thus, a 2026 court ruling is integrated into a political and media discourse that does not deal with the criminal case, but seeks to distort the truth about the Kosovo war, with the aim of intensifying the destabilizing policy toward the Republic of Kosovo.

Media framing in service of a political goal

The instrumentalization of the Hague ruling becomes more understandable in the current context of Serbia’s media system. The problem is that Serbia’s media space is unequal, and pro-regime media enjoy a major advantage in access, reach and influence. According to Freedom House, the ruling parties in Serbia have expanded their influence over the media through control of state-owned enterprises and private media that depend on government funding. The report also notes that the media environment is characterized by propaganda and manipulation of facts on certain issues, including Serbia’s policy toward Kosovo (Freedom House, 2024). Reporters Without Borders (RSF) likewise describe the media space as an environment where propaganda and fake news coexist with professional journalism, and where media critical of the authorities face political and economic pressure (Reporters Without Borders, 2026).

In such a media system, largely controlled by the government, the way a court ruling is reported deliberately contributes to its instrumentalization in the service of political discourse. The headline, selection of statements, use of photographs, and repetition of terms such as “terrorists,” “criminals,” “Serbian victims” and “international injustice” shape perceptions and interpretations of the event before the public has a chance to analyze the legal content of the judgment. This is a classic and familiar mechanism of Serbian propaganda: it is not always necessary to fabricate a fact; it is enough to frame facts in a selective hierarchy. The sentencing of four KLA leaders becomes the main headline, the dismissal of crimes against humanity becomes secondary, is omitted altogether or is framed as an “injustice,” while the broader context of the war and the documented crimes committed by Serbian forces against Albanians remain outside the news frame.

This way of constructing the narrative is consistent with what many scholars have identified as the politics of victimhood in Serbia. According to Jessie Barton Hronešová, Serbian political elites have used victimhood to portray Serbia as the ongoing target of injustice and external hostility. She argues that this narrative has been disseminated through centralized political communication and pro-regime media (Hronešová, 2025:538–539). This is where the most problematic aspect of the instrumentalization lies. Belgrade is not using the ruling to seek justice, but to bring the question of the legitimacy of the Republic of Kosovo back into public discourse. In the official statement of the Government of Serbia, Ivica Dačić directly linked the ruling to the claim that Kosovo cannot be built on the “mass graves” of Serbs (Government of Serbia, 2026).

This communications strategy has a long history in Serbian media. In her analysis titled “Kosovo 1989: The (Ab)use of the Kosovo Myth in Media and Popular Culture”, Radina Vuçetiq (2021) clearly argues that the political use of the “Kosovo myth” and the portrayal of Albanians as a threat have a much longer history, and that the media have been a central instrument in this process (Vučetić, 2021:227-228, 239-240). Therefore, the 2026 Hague ruling did not create the Serbian victimhood narrative; it gives it a new symbolic source. Although the narrative existed before, it can now be said, “The Hague confirmed it too.” This formula has great propaganda potential because it presents a political interpretation as the consequence of a legal ruling. The problem with Serbian propaganda is not that it speaks about victims. The problem lies in its monopolization of the figure of the victim and its use to construct a history in which Serbia is perpetually the victim, while its historical responsibility is relegated to the background. Therefore, in this mechanism, the Hague ruling represents a new link used to rewrite history—a history that does not begin in 2026 and does not end with this judgment. It is precisely in the attempt to frame the judgment as “proof” in interpreting the history, war and statehood of Kosovo that the essence of the instrumentalization of the Hague ruling by Serbian politics and strategic communications lies.