“STUDENT” SERBIA
The Student List’s victory in the early parliamentary elections (25.10.2026) marked the symbolic end of Milošević’s political legacy, but raised the question of whether it would also mark the end of his hegemonic policies. According to the results of the Republic Electoral Commission, the Student List won 53.01 percent of the vote and a significant majority of 140 seats […]
The Student List’s victory in the early parliamentary elections (25.10.2026) marked the symbolic end of Milošević’s political legacy, but raised the question of whether it would also mark the end of his hegemonic policies. According to the results of the Republic Electoral Commission, the Student List won 53.01 percent of the vote and a significant majority of 140 seats in Parliament (RIK, 03.11.2026), bringing an end to Aleksandar Vučić’s long-standing regime; his list received 38.98 percent.
But can the significance of the victory be measured solely by the rotation of power? The main dilemma for the new government is the direction Serbia will take in foreign policy. Regardless of whether the student alliance can bring about ‘democratic transformation’, it faces a long list of challenges related to Kosovo, nationalist rhetoric, European integration and sanctions against Russia (Reuters, 26/10/2026).
The strategic dilemmas of the changeover
The changeover is an important first step, but not enough for a democratic Serbia. Sustainable transformation requires a substantial change in its position toward Kosovo, as well as a break with the political legacy of conflict, uncertainty and regional tensions. Therefore, Serbia’s democratization cannot be measured solely by the quality of its democracy, but also by its approach to normalizing relations with Kosovo through mutual recognition, as a prerequisite for an order based on dialogue and lasting security. Without these changes, there is a risk that the new political elite will inherit the same patterns of the former government, which have hindered Serbia’s domestic democratization and the consolidation of regional stability (Bonomi, 26/10/2026).
In the theory of democratic transition, a change in the governing actors is only one of the possible stages of political change (Lachapelle & Hellmeier, 2024:123). As Thomas Carothers (2002) argues in the article “The End of the Transition Paradigm”, political transition is not a uniform process, because the opening of a system may be followed by democratic consolidation, but may also be accompanied by resistance, institutional deadlock or a return to authoritarian practices (Carothers, 2002:17).
The winning list in Serbia was formed as a broad civic alliance, united primarily around the fight against crime, corruption and the previous model of governance. This undoubtedly gives it considerable legitimacy, but no guarantee of political cohesion in the exercise of power, given that its members and supporters have major differences regarding European integration, Kosovo and relations with Russia. Devra C. Moehler and Staffan I. Lindberg (2009), in their article “Narrowing the Legitimacy Gap: Turnovers as a Cause of Democratic Consolidation”, emphasize that consolidated democracy requires institutions that function independently and are accepted as legitimate mechanisms for resolving political conflicts. According to these authors, holding elections and replacing the governing elite are not enough to consolidate democracy (Moehler and Lindberg, 2009:1448).
This is precisely where the Student List’s paradox lies. It won electoral support through criticism of the former system, while on foreign policy issues it has shown continuity with traditional Serbian nationalism (Bertuzzi, 2026). Analyses of the Student Movement have highlighted its heterogeneous composition, including pro-Europeans, conservatives and nationalists, making it difficult to interpret its victory as a shift toward liberal democracy (Ivanovic, 2026).
Kosovo as a test of political orientation
For Kosovo, the Student List’s victory is a development that requires geopolitical analysis, beyond the symbolism of a generational change. Although this movement emerged as an alternative to the former regime, its positions on Kosovo suggest that a changeover does not necessarily imply a change in the frameworks through which Serbia shapes its relations with its neighbors. In this context, Kosovo remains an important test for assessing whether it will manage to turn civic mobilization into a foreign policy oriented toward dialogue and regional responsibility, or continue to rely on nationalist discourse, as it has indicated before and during the election campaign.
Nevertheless, the first premise for this assessment is the “Memorandum on Kosovo and Metohija” (17.05.2026), in which Kosovo is presented as “an integral part of Serbia and an essential element of Serbian national identity” (N1, 17/05/2026). This approach poses a dangerous challenge for the future, because it shifts the reality of an independent Kosovo away from the framework of dialogue on normalization and toward Serbia’s territorial and identity-based claim. This is where the main paradox of the Serbian student movement emerges. On the one hand, it calls for accountability, the rule of law and a transformation of political culture, while on the other, it continues with nationalist discourse and a territorial claim to Kosovo (Komarčević, 19/05/2026).
Given Serbia’s domestic context, this ambiguity may be interpreted as an electoral calculation to preserve a broad coalition with differing political convictions; however, after the victory, it becomes an indicator of hegemonic continuity that threatens regional peace. The hostile discourse of its representatives even after the elections clearly favors the second option. Dejan Shoshkić, one of the Student Movement’s candidates for Prime Minister, told Euronews (29.10.2026) that “The new government will consider Kosovo, in accordance with the Constitution of Serbia, to be its autonomous province”. Meanwhile, taking an even harder line, in keeping with Dačić’s approach, its representative Radomir Saičić called Kosovo “temporarily occupied territory” (Ivanovic, 2026).
The “students” between the EU and Russia
The Student List has affirmed the same position toward Moscow as the previous government. According to Tomasz Zornaczuk (2026), the movement has no clear position on EU membership, while it has declared itself unambiguously against sanctions on Russia. Its composition is heterogeneous, with differing orientations, ranging from supporters of European integration to nationalists seeking even closer ties with Russia (Zornaczuk, 2026).
The main criticism of this ambiguity concerns the possibility of continuing the policy of balancing, rather than making a turn toward a new strategic orientation. Such positions show that a change of government is not always accompanied by a reassessment of geopolitical priorities. On the contrary, the rhetoric of democratic reform is likely to be merely a façade for coexistence with a foreign policy based on the same calculations as in the past. Nevertheless, Serbia’s relations with Russia are determined not only by historical, religious and cultural ties, but also by strategic interests: energy security and Moscow’s support regarding Kosovo.
This dependence creates an important strategic dilemma: the more Belgrade relies on Russia for support, the more problematic it becomes to align its policy with EU standards and positions. Therefore, it is high time for Brussels to stop tolerating Serbia’s “camouflaged neutrality”. It is high time for the West to force Belgrade to make a clear choice in favor of the European path. Otherwise, continued balancing between Moscow and Brussels risks becoming a “strategic lever” that favors Russia’s revisionist interests.
If the “students” truly seek a democratic Serbia, this process is conditional on the arrest of Radoičić, abandoning the destabilizing strategy toward Kosovo, accepting the reality in the normalization process, breaking away from Russian and Chinese influence, and confronting the criminal legacy of the 1990s.













