Four decades after the Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SANU), the question that still deserves attention is: how does Serbian nationalism envision Kosovo, Serbs outside Serbia’s borders, and its role in the region? The answers reveal a troubling continuity.

Serbia’s political history over the past four decades can be read as a history of changing regimes and, at the same time, of the continuity of some of the fundamental nationalist narratives. From socialist Yugoslavia to today’s Serbia, leaders, institutions, alliances, and the tools of politics have changed. But one element has remained entirely the same: the way most of the Serbian political elite has treated Kosovo and the issue of Serbs outside Serbia. According to Aidan Hehir, the Kosovo myth and the symbolic system of Serbian nationalism, consolidated during the 19th century, were revived and instrumentalized by Serbian nationalists in the 1980s, while Slobodan Milošević and his regime used this narrative to mobilize political support, portraying Serbs, especially those in Kosovo, as a community facing an existential threat (Hehir, 2026: 2). Hehir argues that current statements by the Serbian government about the “ethnic cleansing” of Serbs in Kosovo are not simply reactions to current developments. According to him, they are linked to a longer tradition of Serbian nationalism, in which the Serbs of Kosovo are continually portrayed as a threatened community and victims of a wider danger to Serbia. This way of portraying Kosovo, he argues, has its roots in Serbian nationalism developed during the 19th century and revived and used politically by Milošević in the 1980s. In this sense, today’s narrative about the situation of Serbs in Kosovo can be seen as a continuation, in a form adapted to current circumstances, of a nationalist narrative that has also served to mobilize political support in the past (Hehir, 2026:2, 13).

AD PLACEHOLDER

At the heart of this narrative is victimhood: the idea that Serbs are constantly threatened, that Serbia is the victim of historical and international injustices, and that the Serbian state has a special role in “protecting” Serbs even beyond its borders. Therefore, the question logically follows: is Serbia in 2026 the same as it was in 1986, or what has changed in form and what has remained the same in substance?

From the victimization of Serbs to state nationalism

The loss of the war and of de facto control over Kosovo in 1999 did not mark the end of Serbian nationalism connected to Kosovo. On the contrary, it brought about its transformation. Whereas during the 1980s and 1990s Serbian nationalism relied increasingly on mass mobilization, territorial control, and the use of force, after 1999 this nationalism took an institutional political form through the preservation of the territorial claim, non-recognition of Kosovo’s independence, support for parallel Serbian structures in Kosovo, mobilization of international diplomacy, and the continued use of the victimhood narrative. After the withdrawal of its forces from Kosovo in 1999, Serbia lost direct control over the territory, but did not give up its political and constitutional claim to it. This led to a new situation in which Belgrade, although it could no longer exercise sovereignty over Kosovo, continued to maintain a considerable presence and influence, particularly through the Serbian community and parallel structures operating in Serb-majority areas.

The study by Van der Borgh and Lasance (2013) shows that after 1999 the Serbian authorities began rebuilding Serbian institutions in the parts of Kosovo where the population was predominantly Serb. These structures created forms of parallel governance that maintained the political, administrative, and financial ties between Belgrade and the Serbian community in Kosovo (Van Der Borgh & Lasance, 2013:187). This development is important for understanding the transformation of state nationalism after 1999. Serbia was unable to control Kosovo through its security apparatus across the entire territory, but it maintained an indirect state presence through parallel institutions, funding, education, healthcare, and local structures. In his article “Resisting International State Building in Kosovo” (2012), Van Der Borgh argues that these institutions did not serve only to provide services, but also had a political function: to strengthen the presence of the Serbian state in Kosovo and oppose the international subjectivity and consolidation of Kosovo’s institutions (Van Der Borgh, 2012:35-36). In this sense, nationalism changed its instrument, but not its goal. The main objective remained the preservation of the link between Kosovo Serbs and the Serbian state and, from a broader perspective, the preservation of the idea that Kosovo was not and is not a foreign state, but a territory that Serbia continues to consider an integral part of itself. This is why nationalist discourse has real consequences. When a community is continually portrayed as threatened, when a territory is portrayed as stolen, and when a state builds its political identity on “protecting” that community, the line between rhetoric and mobilization becomes very thin.

Recent studies of Serbian political discourse after 2022 show that historical memory and victimhood narratives continue to play an important role in how political elites in Serbia interpret the situation in Kosovo. According to Ismaili and Marleku (2026), Serbian political elites have selectively used elements of narratives of resistance, victimhood, martyrdom, and “defensive war” to portray the Serbian community in Kosovo as a threatened community, while presenting its political or armed actions as justifiable forms of resistance. The authors link this approach particularly to two developments: the coordinated withdrawal of Kosovo Serbs from institutions in 2022 and the attack in Banjska in 2023. According to them, these should not be seen as isolated episodes, but as part of a more comprehensive strategy by Serbian elites to appropriate and reshape historical narratives in order to contest political legitimacy in Kosovo (Ismaili & Marleku, 2026). In this way, memory and victimhood become political tools that influence not only perceptions of the past, but also how tensions and political actions in the present are justified.

“The Serbian World”: a new name for old ideas

Over the past decade, the concept of the “Serbian World” has appeared with increasing frequency, an idea that in political and cultural discourse aims at a stronger connection among Serbs in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Kosovo, and other countries in the region (Horák & Čermák,2026:5). For its supporters, this can be presented as a cultural, linguistic, and national connection. The problem arises when the cultural connection is turned into a project and an instrument of Serbia’s regional policy. A study published in Pregled in 2025 treats Serbian nationalism as a regional challenge and argues that today’s policy of the “Serbian World” constitutes a renaming of elements of the historical “Greater Serbia” project. The study specifically mentions Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, Kosovo, and North Macedonia as areas where this policy has the potential to create tensions (Todorović, 2025:46). In this sense, changing the name and the way this policy is presented does not necessarily mean that the aims or narratives that existed in the past have disappeared. On the contrary, they can emerge in a new political language and in forms more adapted to contemporary reality. Although this does not mean that every form of cultural connection among Serbs is a threat, the history of the Balkans shows that the line between culture and politics becomes problematic when a state, as in Serbia’s case, has territorial claims and contests the sovereignty of neighboring states. From this perspective, the “Serbian World” can be understood not simply as a political or identity-based slogan, but as a broader project that aims to preserve and expand Serbian influence in the region. According to Arben Fetoshi (2025), this project is closely connected with nationalist narratives, ethnic mobilization, and the use of information warfare, emerging as a factor that can negatively affect security, stability, and interethnic relations in the Western Balkans (Fetoshi, 2025).

It is worth noting that the “Serbian World” is almost a copy of the Russian concept Russkiy mir (“Russian World”), particularly in how linguistic, cultural, religious, and identity ties are used to create a space that extends beyond the state’s borders. Dimitar Bechev (2023), in his article “Hedging Its Bets: Serbia Between Russia and the EU”, notes that Serbia’s network of formal and informal ties in the region resembles “Russkiy mir”, describing the “Serbian World” as a space through which Serbia exercises influence beyond its borders. Furthermore, the author emphasizes that this approach is perceived as potentially linked to Serbian revanchism, making it a destabilizing factor for regional security and stability (Bechev, 2023).

In this sense, the “Serbian World” should not be seen as an idea that suddenly began a few years ago. The name is relatively new, but the elements it carries are much older. The main difference lies in the way it is articulated. Instead of an explicit claim to Serbia’s territorial expansion, the focus is placed on the “unity of the Serbian people,” the protection of identity, and the preservation of cultural and political ties. However, historical continuity cannot be ignored. From Garašanin’s Načertanije, through 20th-century nationalism and up to the discourse of the “Serbian World,” the idea is repeated that the Serbian nation extends beyond the borders of the Republic of Serbia and that Belgrade has a special role in preserving its unity (Ljubomirović, 2024:135-140). This does not mean that all these projects are identical, but it points to a particular line of continuity in Serbian political thought. In a broader context, such a policy can deepen ethnic divisions and create new tensions in a region that remains fragile. Therefore, the “Serbian World” poses a potential threat to regional peace. If 1986 marked the beginning of a period in which victimhood and the Kosovo issue were placed at the center of Serbian nationalist mobilization, four decades later, unfortunately, these narratives have not disappeared; their continuity remains troubling and poses an ongoing challenge to regional peace and security.