Kurti’s Dangerous Path
The constitutional deadline passed. Kosovo’s Assembly was not constituted. The new Speaker was not elected. And, instead of the institutional crisis coming to an end, an even more dangerous phase began: an attempt to interpret the constitution according to the political needs of the moment. This is no longer just a matter of a candidacy for Speaker of the Assembly. It is not […]
The constitutional deadline passed. Kosovo’s Assembly was not constituted. The new Speaker was not elected. And, instead of the institutional crisis coming to an end, an even more dangerous phase began: an attempt to interpret the constitution according to the political needs of the moment.
This is no longer just a matter of a candidacy for Speaker of the Assembly. Nor is it an ordinary disagreement between parties; rather, it is a clash between the political will of one party and the constitutional rules that must apply to everyone.
Albin Kurti is not proposing a candidate for Speaker of the Assembly, but is seeking extra time for a broader political agreement, one that would not cover only the constitution of the Assembly, but also the issue of electing the president.
At first glance, this may sound like an attempt to find a political solution. In essence, however, it is an approach that pushes the problem further down the road and places the constitution in the position of a document that can be negotiated according to the interests of the parties.
The constitution is not a political agreement. It cannot be amended through an understanding between leaders. It cannot be suspended because one party cannot find a formula for electing the Speaker of the Assembly. And, even less so, it cannot be used as a pressure tool to force other parties into a political bargain over the president. This is where the fundamental problem with Kurti’s approach lies.
If there is a constitutional deadline, it does not exist as decoration. Deadlines were set precisely to prevent institutions from being held hostage to the will of one party or the calculations of a political leader. Respecting them is part of the constitutional order.
Failing to respect them while seeking extra time for a political agreement creates a dangerous precedent. Because the question that must be asked is simple: what happens next time?
If a parliamentary majority does not have the necessary numbers to elect the Speaker of the Assembly, can it ask for extra time? If it cannot agree on a president, can it hold up the constitution of the Assembly until an agreement is reached? If a political leader thinks that a particular constitutional interpretation serves his interests, can he delay the implementation of the constitution until the political conditions are right for him? If the answer is yes, then we no longer have a functioning constitutional order, but a system in which the rules depend on the political power of whoever interprets them. And this is precisely the danger of Kurti’s approach.
It is not a problem that Kurti is seeking a political agreement. In politics, agreements are essential. The problem begins when an attempt is made to place a political agreement above a constitutional obligation. The constitution cannot become a bargaining chip.
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If Kurti wants an agreement on the president, it can be negotiated. If he wants political guarantees for a governing mandate, he can negotiate. If he wants support from other parties, he must convince them. But he cannot use the failure to constitute the Assembly as an instrument to force others to accept a political package. This shifts the crisis from a problem of numbers in the Assembly to a problem of respecting the constitutional order.
And Kurti bears the main responsibility for this continuing crisis. He is the leader of the political force that came first. He bears the greatest responsibility for proposing a solution. He should be the first to take seriously the need to make the institutions functional. But instead, he is choosing to prolong the uncertainty by making one constitutional step conditional on a much broader political agreement.
This is not leadership.
Leadership would mean understanding that winning an election does not give you the right to interpret the system as you wish. An electoral mandate gives you responsibility, not the privilege of bypassing the rules. When a party does not have the numbers to elect the Speaker of the Assembly, it must negotiate. But it must negotiate within the constitutional framework. If it fails to reach an agreement, it must face the political consequences of that failure. It cannot endlessly shift the cost of failure onto the state.
Kosovo has already paid a high price for the institutional crisis. Every new day without a functioning Assembly and consolidated institutions deepens political, economic and international uncertainty. But more worrying than the crisis itself is its normalization.
The impression is being created that deadlines can be extended, procedures can be dragged out, and the constitution can be interpreted flexibly whenever the political outcome does not suit those in power. This is a very dangerous path.
Democracy is measured not only by the number of votes a leader receives, but also by that leader’s willingness to submit to the rules when they are not in his favor. This is the true test for Kurti. If he believes in the rule of law, he must respect the constitution even when it limits his political room for maneuver. If he believes in institutions, he must make them functional even when he does not have all the numbers. If he believes in democracy, he must accept that political agreements are built through compromise, not institutional obstruction.
Kosovo does not need another cycle of crisis. It needs a functioning Assembly, legitimate institutions, and political clarity. And above all, it needs a clear message: no one, regardless of how many votes they have, is above the constitution. Not even Albin Kurti.
This crisis will not be remembered only as a disagreement over the Speaker of the Assembly, but as the moment when politics tried to push the limits of the constitution beyond what it allows. If that limit is pushed today for a political agreement, tomorrow it may be pushed for another. This is why Kurti’s approach is dangerous. The state cannot function with rules that change whenever the interests of those in power change.














