A highly intelligent journalist asked me one day: “Professor, a little while ago you said in several media outlets that in Kosovo ‘the opposition has lost the door to its courtyard’. Could you explain this interesting remark of yours about the crisis we find ourselves in?”

First, I told him, this remark is not so much interesting as it is meaningful and important not only for the opposition, but for society as a whole. In fact, it is a metaphor that helps citizens illustrate the amorphous, uncreative and, I would add, untrustworthy state of our political entities. It is also a clear and highly realistic message describing our crisis, which has now begun to take on the dimensions and hues of “controlled chaos,” in which two political blocs, with different ethical and moral platforms and competencies, are competing and confronting one another by democratic means. The former government, with its constant cause of “extending sovereignty and security” in the north of the country, is now clearly “maintaining” its hold on power successfully, albeit much more through the status of resignations than that of legality and legitimacy, and managing to control the overall situation through its victories over these past 18 months and beyond, while the former opposition, with its procedural verbiage, still has no major cause it has articulated.

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Second, to establish its project around this missing cause, the former opposition (LDK, PDK, AAK) does not so much need an “anti-Kurti” program as it needs to find a new cause that would make the political logic of “for or against Kurti” unnecessary. This logic is bringing the opposition more decline than electoral gains. In fact, this argument was also borne out and demonstrated in the elections of June 7, 2026, in which LVV once again became the largest force, with around 43%, but without a sufficient majority to govern alone, while the former opposition was once again left where it had been almost 20 months earlier. Therefore, this missing opposition cause, which I have illustrated with the metaphor that “the opposition has lost the door to its courtyard,” de facto and de jure should not be built around the slogan already being promoted, “overthrow Kurti at any cost,” but around the creative idea and concept of how to “normalize the state.” Because, as I have said several times and repeat once again, Kosovo’s crisis does not lie only in the projection and perception of who is governing, but in the way it is being governed. I say this because the “Ahtisaari” architects deliberately designed this Constitution so that the minority would never be able to obstruct the will of the political (Albanian) majority or the ethnic (Serb) majority. So the projection, or the phrase that should guide the new opposition cause, is not about “who is governing,” but “in what way and at what level of quality” Kosovo is being governed. This approach would allow the opposition to reach new groups of voters who are not necessarily against Kurti, but who, disappointed by the crisis and political polarization, are increasingly tending to abstain from voting…

Third, the opposition, judging by its recent (in)actions, as far as I can tell, is slowly but surely entering the discourse of open conflict, despite its failed attempts to build a politics of consensus, as we saw in the scenarios in Parliament. And in my judgment, it is making a mistake again, because a new cause is not built through imitative, conflictual mobilization, as LVV did when it was in opposition, but through creative, unifying mobilization. The approach I am advocating does not mean that the opposition should be soft on those in power. On the contrary, it should be firm in its aims, but also moderate and creative in its methods and tactics. Hence, the opposition can build its missing cause only if it manages to articulate the current conflict being produced by the “Ahtisaari Republic,” where it also formally gives the impression that it advocates for its “articles” and spirit, as a genuine cause, which I identify as a “Functional Republic.” This cause, in a way, is not only positioned as the antithesis of LVV’s “Third Republic,” “licensed” by Albin Kurti himself. Naturally, the “course” I am recommending to the opposition carries evident repercussions and risks. One of these risks or repercussions, without any doubt, concerns its return to the trap of the “Ahtisaari” spirit that they themselves installed. So, the path of the “Functional Republic” I am proposing to the opposition is full of thorns and unknowns, both political and legal. But I believe that for now, it is the only path that could enable it, in the future, to recover its former reputation. In other words, Kurti can be defeated electorally only if the former opposition manages to create a new political identity and configuration that will exist both without Kurti and after Kurti. But while rebuilding or reconsolidating the “Ahtisaari” architecture through what we are calling a “Functional Republic,” the opposition must also plan how to “divorce” from it. It must do this with a surgical “scalpel,” because, faced with the “Third Republic,” its chances of survival are very slim…

Fourth, the fundamental issues that should be raised, assessed and interpreted in the opposition’s closed debates about this new opposition cause should mainly be channeled into no more than 4–5 fundamental pillars, which I identify as pillars or starting points. They could be built primarily around the need for: a) functional institutions that are much more adaptive and flexible for citizens; b) confronting the economic crisis that is increasingly threatening citizens’ social status; c) deep reforms in justice, which would derive from this “Functional Constitution” I mentioned; and especially d) the need to begin drafting policies related to promoting a much more aggressive, pragmatic and practical diplomacy, because those are the circumstances.

This cause, which I am offering the opposition gratis, without charging a penny, and which those in power would find difficult to contest, should also replace the absurd slogan “Kurti must go” with either: “Kosovo must function,” or: “We, as the opposition, do not want only to change the government; we want to change the way the state functions.”

Fifth, I am now raising a vital hypothesis for the interests of the state and, in the long term, of the nation as well. I believe it should be put forward carefully and thoughtfully, because it concerns the stigmatization and prejudice that, in my judgment, the opposition has used as misguided political tactics. This hypothesis has to do with, let us call it, “friendship and alliance with the West.” We have witnessed all sorts of demeaning and even insulting public epithets directed at Prime Minister Albin Kurti, identifying him as “anti-American,” “North Korean,” a “dictator,” and so on. Hand on heart, these have done more harm to themselves and the political entities they belonged to than to Albin Kurti’s charisma! I believe the effects of this language, especially on social media, have only served to boost Albin Kurti. The claim “Albin Kurti is against America” is ill-conceived, extremely harmful and even primitive! So why, instead of this deliberate attempt to denigrate him, not say: “Can we build the state while at the same time having strong sovereignty and strong alliances with America?” Or: “What can we do together to create a much more effective and productive diplomacy with our Euro-Atlantic allies?” Because citizens need to be instilled with the understanding that patriotism is not only defending the state in war, but also building it in peace and making it livable for all people, without ethnic, social, political or even racial distinctions. This would be the main pillar of the opposition cause.

Sixth, alongside these pillars, it should meanwhile complete the final framework with sub-pillars, equally relevant to the state of Kosovo. Some of the priorities that could emerge from these sub-pillars, for example, would be competing for a functional state, a professional administration, a competitive economy, and higher-quality education and healthcare, and so on. These pillars and sub-pillars would more or less raise the opposition’s standing and turn it into a serious alternative state-building offer.

Seventh and finally, I believe—and am indeed firmly convinced—that Kosovo no longer needs an opposition waiting for Albin Kurti’s government to fall on its own. Put simply: Kosovo is not merely experiencing a crisis of politics, but a crisis in the way the current political governance has been designed and how it functions; then, why the institutions of the Republic today are more fragmented than the act of social consensus, or why our political parties are more personalized than institutionalized, and why political culture is more conflictual than conciliatory. These are some of the themes that I believe the current Kosovo opposition should broadly place within the framework of its missing cause. Because it will never be able to defeat Kurti by becoming more “anti-Kurti,” but only by being more convincing than Kurti in the “eyes and ears” of the electorate about how the state should function and how the Albanian nation should be protected amid these uncertain and unstable circumstances in the region. In my view, this approach would undoubtedly also serve the interests of the allies…