Military mobilization has always been a difficult issue for the European Union, just like creating a common army. But what was avoided until just a few years ago has now become unavoidable. Germany wants the Bundeswehr to be combat-ready by 2029, the EU has set the “Readiness 2030” target, while NATO calls on allies to raise overall defense spending to 5% of GDP by 2035. These dates do not predict the start of a war, but they show that Europe still lacks the capabilities for a long, high-intensity conflict.

This mobilization gap has prompted the US—namely, President Donald Trump—to pressure European countries, demanding that the latter shoulder a greater share of the security burden. The growing competition between the US and China requires ever more American attention and resources. In all this, the West is buying time to increase weapons production, ammunition stockpiles, air defense, troop numbers, and military mobility, including the “Military Schengen” project. At the same time, Europe is trying to reduce its dependence on the US in technology, finance, payment systems, and digital infrastructure as well. This shows that European mobilization is not only military, but part of a broader effort toward strategic autonomy.

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But while mobilization is a sign of future strength, it may also be a sign of present weakness. When a system declares that it needs several years to prepare for war, its adversaries understand that the West has identified the threat, but is still not fully ready to confront it.

The window before Western mobilization

This period of mobilization creates a strategic window in which the West is growing stronger, while during this transition it remains cautious and focused on crisis management, without being ready for direct confrontation.

For Russian leader Vladimir Putin, however, this approach is expressed in a different formula: “If a fight is inevitable, you have to strike first”. Putin said this as a personal lesson and a logic of self-defense, not as an official declaration of preventive war, but his formula establishes the premise that if a conflict has become inevitable, it can justify acting before the adversary.

Putin’s most prominent public ally in the Western Balkans, namely in Serbia, Aleksandar Vulin, recently raised the question in an interview of why Moscow should wait until 2030, when, according to him, Europe will be ready for a direct confrontation with Russia. In his view, this extreme military action is a compelled response to a future threat from the West.

These statements do not demonstrate any joint plan to start a war before 2029, but they confirm a shared way of thinking: if the adversary will be more powerful in a few years, waiting is not peace, but a loss of initiative. Vulin openly expresses what others cloak in terms such as deterrence, self-defense, indivisible security, or a multipolar order.

For now, the West is pursuing a policy of controlled pressure toward Russia, supporting Ukraine and imposing sanctions while restricting Moscow’s access to technology. However, it continually avoids a direct confrontation between NATO and Russia. The logic may lie in avoiding a nuclear risk, but at the same time Russia is being given time to adapt, mobilize its economy, and increase military production.

Therefore, the problem that arises is that the time the West is buying does not belong to the West alone.

This time is also being used by the West’s adversaries to weaken it from within. Disinformation, political polarization, radicalization, and the loss of trust in institutions distract societies from strategic threats and reduce their ability to act collectively. Thus, the West may become militarily stronger, while at the same time becoming more politically and socially fragmented during the mobilization process.

Multipolarism is gaining ground while we wait

This period of Western mobilization is giving the “multipolarist” scenario room to consolidate. This scenario is based not only on the economic rise of countries such as China or the expansion of BRICS, but also on a political narrative that opposes Western supremacy and calls for a redistribution of global power.

Vladimir Putin has described this vision, saying that Russia must develop as “one of the centers of a fairer multipolar world that is now taking shape.” Thus, multipolarism in Russian strategy is not only about distributing power among several states, but about changing the international order itself. In this vision, Russia does not see itself merely as a traditional power, but as a distinct civilization with its own interests, path, and strategic space.

Serbia has also adopted this idea and translated it to the Balkan level, where, for Belgrade, the weakening of the Western order and the rise of new centers of power create an opportunity for Serbia to escape the constraints of the Euro-Atlantic order and pursue its national objectives.

In this scenario, Russia and China do not need to defeat the West immediately in a direct confrontation. It is enough to reduce its ability to respond effectively in areas of strategic interest, exhaust it through long-term commitments and unresolved conflicts, and create the perception that the Western order is no longer the sole guarantor of stability and power.

Through the expansion of BRICS, alternative financial mechanisms, greater use of national currencies, and the strengthening of energy, technological, and military ties, Russia and China are building alternatives that gradually weaken Western exclusivity. The current order is not being replaced immediately, but is fragmenting: the more alternatives states outside traditional Western structures have, the more the West’s ability to use its instruments of influence diminishes.

This is where the strategic paradox lies. Mobilization is necessary to preserve defense capabilities, but prolonged engagement in crises consumes political, economic, and military resources, creating room for rivals to expand. Russia and China do not need to bring down the West through a single confrontation; they need only a system in which it remains an important actor, but no longer the sole center that sets the rules, institutions, and limits of international action.

This is precisely the space from which countries such as Serbia also benefit, since in a system where competition among centers of power is growing, even smaller states gain more room to maneuver.

The West’s decline does not necessarily bring peace

The fall of the West or its weakening does not guarantee a more peaceful or just world. This is because the actors joining together against the West do not share a vision for governing the world.

China, Russia, India, Iran, Brazil, the Gulf powers, and other states all have different interests, political models, and rivalries. They have neither a commonly accepted approach nor a shared security architecture, let alone binding mechanisms for resolving conflicts among themselves.

As long as the West remains their main adversary, multipolarists can set these differences aside, but if the Western center is seriously weakened, a leadership vacuum will emerge, and the question will be who fills it. Rivalries such as that between China and India may then come to the fore, along with the asymmetry of China-Russia relations, competition between Iran and the Arab powers, and the race for leadership of the Global South.

Thus, BRICS may be a coalition capable of opposing, but not necessarily a coalition capable of governing.

We already have a historical analogy in the period between the First and Second World Wars. The lessons of this period should not be ignored, because the First World War succeeded in destroying the old order but did not produce a successor system with legitimacy and balance. The powers of the time exploited this vacuum and created conditions that would not end competition, but would create the conditions for another war.

Therefore, the weakening of the Western order may not end in multipolar peace, but in conflicts that would not resolve who will replace it and under what rules.

The end of this decade may find the West militarily stronger, but it may also find it in a less Western and more unstable world.

Therefore, the question here is not whether the West will be ready by 2029, but how much ground it will have lost by then, or what kind of order will have emerged in the meantime.

Buying hope in exchange for time, on the expectation that it will be stronger—which allows adversaries to use that time—brings us back to the question: to whom is it giving that time?