The Sacrifice
The fates of small nations emerge through the doors of great tragedies. I had read this sorrowful sentence in the memoirs of Ismail Qemal Bey, and it was the first thing that came to mind as I mulled over what I had just heard. Only a few minutes had passed since the words of American judge Charles Smith, from The Hague, had reached my office. On a mid-September morning, he was deciding not only the fate of the four men before him, but also that of more than one and a half million Albanians. For the more than an hour the hearing lasted, nearly a century of imprisonment was handed down to four Albanians who dared to dream of freedom, fight for it, and bring it to their people.
The fates of small nations emerge through the doors of great tragedies. I had read this sorrowful sentence in the memoirs of Ismail Qemal Bey, and it was the first thing that came to mind as I mulled over what I had just heard. Only a few minutes had passed since the words of American judge Charles Smith, from The Hague, had reached my office. On a mid-September morning, he was deciding not only the fate of the four men before him, but also that of more than one and a half million Albanians. For the more than an hour the hearing lasted, nearly a century of imprisonment was handed down to four Albanians who dared to dream of freedom, fight for it, and bring it to their people.
The scene, which seemed lifted from the Kafkaesque universe, would have been utterly unfamiliar to anyone looking back from the spring and summer of ’99. The calamity of the Albanian people of Kosovo had shaken the foundations of Western civilization. The monstrous crimes committed by the Serbs, with the aim of creating a space without Albanians (a sister to “Judenfrei”), were becoming known to tens and even hundreds of millions around the world through the lens of photojournalists’ cameras and television crews, and had stirred human conscience. The democratic world decided to intervene, to put an end to those horrors. To lend a helping hand to those few thousand Albanians who dared to fight for freedom. And to give hope to millions of others. It seemed then, and seems even more unbelievable today when one thinks about it, that the West bombed Yugoslavia because of the Albanians. It seems like a dream.
Before thirty years had passed, everything was turned upside down. Another shift had taken place in the axis of the world. Someone might say that everything had returned to its original state. The cynical smile of Hashim Thaçi, the founding father of the state of Kosovo, after the judge, invoking “in the name of the people of Kosovo,” sentenced him to 25 years in prison, had this painful truth written all over it. As the founder of the Albanian state recounted the London Conference, he wrote in his memoirs: deeply sunk in depression, as we watched the future of our reborn country darken, (the great powers) consoled us by telling us that we (the Albanians) had to be sacrificed for the common good of Europe.
1.
The relationship of the Balkan peoples in general, and Albanians in particular, with the mother continent has always been difficult, complicated, one might say. Inattention, connected to ignorance and perhaps also a refusal to know them, must have played an important role in this complication. Twice, in Berlin and in London, the great European powers “washed their hands” of the Balkan peoples—to the detriment of the Albanians, as Pontius Pilate had done in the trial of Jesus Christ. Their deafness and blindness, accompanied by superficial explanations and ready-made judgments, have spawned horrors and barbarities of a scale the continent has rarely seen.
The “English lens” of 1916, as a British naval intelligence report would later be known, originally published under the title “A handbook of Serbia, Montenegro, Albania, and adjacent parts of Greece,” was an exercise, an attempt that must have been the first by one of the great powers to understand what this people was. When you look at the characters included in it, a strange and almost absurd mixture, it is not difficult to grasp the confusion faced by those who, through that report, were trying to understand the Albanian population. Whether such an amalgam of the least educated and the most learned, of the darkest and the most enlightened figures, contributed to a deeper understanding—or misunderstanding—of the Albanians, no one can really say.
At the beginning of the second decade of the twentieth century, Albania was the last Balkan country to reach the great family of nations. To the misfortune of the Albanians, this was happening at the worst possible moment. Europe was on the brink of war. And war would begin in the Balkans. Its neighbors hurried, some sooner and some more eagerly than others, to descend upon it and tear away as much of its land as they could. Without an army, without weapons, and without even properly understanding what was happening, the Albanians became prey to one of the bloodiest wars the world has known. This was the first scene of a multi-act tragedy, the most dreadful part of which would be played out in Kosovo.
Even at the end of the century, when the Albanian people of Kosovo had been brought to their knees and the Serbian beast was draining their life away, a kind of restraint and limitation, accompanied by doses of cynicism, was visible everywhere. Neither the horror darkening the eyes of the world, nor the images of butchered children, nor the knife-slashed bellies of pregnant women were enough to counter efforts to create a criminal symmetry between the sacrifice of an entire people and the Serbian police officers and soldiers who had been killed. All manner of formulations were sought and found to justify this unprecedented disgrace: “sovereignty,” “respect for borders,” and many others, among which the most cynical was “internal conflict.”
The attempt to condemn both sides, in other words to wash one’s hands of the matter, was plain to see. It was February ’98 when the U.S. special envoy for the Balkans, Robert Gelbard, condemned Serbian violence in Belgrade, without forgetting to add that, for him and the U.S. government, the KLA was “without any doubt, a terrorist group.” Less than two weeks later, the Serbian state police, military, and paramilitary apparatus would be put to work committing the supreme crime: wiping out a family at its roots. Only after photographs of that flesh-creeping crime had gone around the world did Europe’s and the democratic world’s eyes and ears begin to open, albeit timidly.
When NATO bombing finally began on March 24, it seemed to the Albanians that something older than the horrors of that war had also been broken: the habit of pacifying the Balkans through their misfortune. For the first time, on the scale of that intervention, it was clear that the powers of the world had taken the side of the victim. There was reason to believe that, along with the war, a long loneliness was coming to an end.
2.
During the Kosovo war and especially afterward, it was said more than a little, sometimes more clearly and sometimes under one’s breath, that the attention paid to the Albanian people had supposedly been excessive, and that NATO’s intervention had supposedly cleansed consciences. A strange impatience to close the chapter on the Albanians as quickly as possible began to grow ever more dominant. Calls to investigate for crimes (!) those who had barely escaped extermination began even before the first mass graves had been opened. The more those black mouths in the earth multiplied, the more numerous and louder became the cries of the perpetrators and accomplices to the crime. The testimony of the dead was far too horrific, and now salvation was sought in the old Serbian habit of projecting one’s crime onto someone else.
The zeal with which the new—and once again foreign—justice system in the country began persecuting KLA soldiers was difficult to explain then, and remains so today. It cannot be said with certainty whether there was a project, a political or ideological framework, but the fervor of some and the urging of others to condemn them first and then say: see, the Albanians weren’t angels either; they committed crimes too, bore a threatening resemblance to the habit mentioned above, which for a brief time seemed to have been left behind by Europe: that of “condemning both sides.”
In this complicated and deeply immoral undertaking to tarnish the liberation war of the Albanian people of Kosovo, alongside the Serbs and others—those whom, to use a metaphor, we might call “The Usual Suspects”—there were also plenty of renegade Albanians. The labeling and humiliation of KLA girls and boys, which had begun even before the war, calling them Marxists, terrorists and fascists, even Serbian agents, intensified and darkened after the war. They were called profiteers. Thieves. Criminals and murderers, too.
Decades of imprisonment would be handed down to commanders and soldiers from almost all the combat zones. The totalitarianism of that justice system would try to make the guilt total, too. It was another sacrifice that was no longer even requested of the Albanians of Kosovo, but imposed on them. It seemed that the help they had been given so they would not be uprooted from their land had left them forever without the right to object.
Though not entirely obvious at first glance, the persecution of the liberators would gather momentum after the declaration of independence. Like what happens after an earthquake at sea, when waves begin to rise and surge toward the shore, after February 17, 2008, efforts increased to find, indeed to concoct and invent, the most heinous crimes with which the KLA war could be spattered, and, if possible, stained. Less than two months later, in April of that year, Russian K. Kosachev, drawing on the memoirs of The Hague prosecutor Del Ponte, presented a motion to the Council of Europe to investigate suspicions of human organ trafficking. Two years later, Swiss senator D. Marty published the report. In it, Hashim Thaçi was presented as the head of a criminal group that included almost the entire KLA leadership.
The accusations emerging from that report initially seemed like the sort of thing that causes a person irritation and annoyance more than any real concern. The so-called “yellow house,” where it was said that operations so complicated had been performed that most of the most modern hospitals in both Albanian states still could not perform them today, not only could not have been a hospital, but that ruin, belonging to another time, could hardly be called a house. “Nasgjaja – dami i gaçëm” is an expression we Gheg speakers use to show that contempt never goes without consequences. Some of the leadership of the time, including Thaçi himself, beyond the “nasgjaja,” failed to grasp the grave weight of the accusations or properly read the warning signs of the coming storm.
3.
After being forgotten for entire centuries and overlooked during the last and bloodiest one, the twentieth, the pacification of the Balkans, which may be called Europe’s courtyard, became a need of the new century. And there can be no peace on this peninsula without two of its three main peoples, Albanians and Serbs, reaching an understanding. This must have been the impetus for one of the people closest to former German Chancellor A. Merkel when, in September 2017, at a meeting with Kosovo’s president, Hashim Thaçi, and Serbia’s, Aleksandar Vučić, he implied that they—that is, the Europeans—would be willing to accept a final agreement between the two countries, after which mutual recognition would take place. In Kosovo, meanwhile, the dispute over the border with Montenegro continued to keep the country on tenterhooks. Two years had passed since the assembly had voted to establish the Specialist Chambers, another burden the political leadership of the time had agreed to take upon itself. Added to these was the agreement to establish the Association of Serb-majority municipalities, whose implementation European diplomacy, especially the Germans themselves, was demanding with ever-increasing insistence.
The dinner at the German ambassador’s residence took place a year before the idea of redrawing borders became public. At that time, not much time had passed since a senior German diplomat had also mentioned the possibility of a referendum on northern Kosovo, after twenty-five years. This was added to the demand for the Association, for which it had by then become difficult to tell who was pressing harder: European diplomacy or Serbian diplomacy. That before the German-American rift there had been a kind of agreement to accept a final deal that Kosovo and Serbia would agree to can also be understood from German ambassador Christian H.’s categorical rejection of the possibility of changing borders, even before Thaçi himself spoke about it. Less than ten months after the meeting in New York, the Germans had changed sides.
Near-religious faith in the Americans and an intuition that had rarely failed him must have prompted Thaçi, despite that dramatic movement of the tectonic plates, not to waver himself and to push forward the idea of redrawing borders as the final solution to the longstanding problem with Serbia. Unfortunately, the emphasis here falls on the pronoun “himself,” which among Albanians only makes sense as an adjective. Alone. Thaçi was alone in this initiative and intended to remain so. The thirst for glory, that curse that has constantly followed Albanian leaders, had clouded his judgment. The only one who liberated the Albanians. The only one who secured their independence. The only one who separated them from the Serbs once and for all. The only one. Always the only one.
From August 2018 until June 2020, when the indictment against him came like a bolt from the blue, Thaçi was alone. Except for Edi Rama, all Albanian political leaders would oppose him. Some did not understand. Others did not believe. Still others both understood and believed, but wanted a share of the glory that Thaçi wanted for himself. One of them, slapping the table with his hand during an informal conversation, had said: “This won’t work if you just keep cursing; he wants it all for himself.” There were many such inglorious episodes. They became particularly frequent after opposition to him—and not necessarily to the idea—created some of the most unnatural alliances. All manner of servants, fixers, journalists, “writers, poets, and fools” coupled with all sorts of agents and remnants of the former regime to spawn the most heinous accusations and fantasies.
Society had been so poisoned by these fabrications that it is difficult to say whether, on the morning of November 5, 2020, when Hashim Thaçi spoke to the people for the last time as president before setting off for The Hague, more people were saddened or rejoiced at the news that the man who had signed for freedom and declared independence was being imprisoned. Without much fanfare, unlike when he had entered Albanian life almost three decades earlier, he set off for his next battle. Let it be the last, he must have thought.
Interlude. When rulers quarrel
This extended intermezzo may help explain part of the complicated mechanism that controls the fates of people and peoples, creates patriots and traitors, decides as much as it unmasks, and closes and opens eras. The events mentioned here are merely a few inflection points, drawn from a multitude of curves within the great graph that outlines our society.
Between 2010 and 2015, when Swiss senator D. Marty’s report was approved and the legal and constitutional basis for establishing the juridical monster known as the Kosovo Specialist Chambers was voted through parliament, another dramatic development was taking place on the other side of the world: the United States was trying to reach an understanding with Iran over the latter’s nuclear program. And, as if by an unfortunate coincidence of circumstances, the ayatollahs’ state was in Russia’s sphere of influence. In other words, without official Moscow, which would later act as guarantor of the agreement, Washington could not even hope to persuade Tehran to sign. The counterweight? A small people and state, three thousand kilometers away. Hadn’t Russian K. Kosachev been the initiator of the motion in the Council of Europe for the so-called investigations into organ trafficking, which D. Marty would later conduct?! The text of this agreement would be agreed on July 14 and approved on October 18, 2015. Between those two dates, on August 3, the Kosovo Assembly voted to establish what is now known as the Specialist Chambers.
Much has been said and written about how the politicians of that time capitulated, how the current ones warned us, and how Kosovo’s lawyers failed. Nonsense. The double blackmail faced by the leaders of the time, and which J. Steinbaum, a longtime associate of Congressman Eliot Engel, spoke about recently, offered no way out. “Establish it yourselves, or the UN will establish it”—that was the message they had been given. The subtext was clear: either with us or with China and Russia. Indeed, they were told not only to establish it, but, as a friend of mine, a former senior diplomat, had told me, that they were not allowed to change even a comma. The chest-beaters who shout and run around claiming that they alone had warned and predicted what would happen are, at best, deceived, and at worst, part of the deception.
Now let us return to the quarrel, because we are always eager to talk about it. When Donald Trump became president of the United States, the shock was not confined within the country’s borders, but swept across almost the entire globe. It soon became clear that he would shake the whole geopolitical edifice. At his first meeting with German Chancellor Merkel, besides ignoring her, he refused to shake her hand. This was a clear indication that America had changed and the world would have to get used to it. A few months later, at the NATO summit in Brussels, Trump rebuked European leaders, demanding that they pay their obligations if they wanted him and America to stay. After the summit, the German chancellor would declare that the time when Europeans could rely on the Americans was over.
For a while, partly because Germany held elections and was compelled to focus on itself for several months, it seemed as though things had calmed down. However, with the formation of the new government, Merkel would face new difficulties. Even a second visit to Washington within a year was not resolving them. Trump had imposed tariffs on the EU and was determined to withdraw from the nuclear agreement with Iran. The quarrel would reach troubling proportions in July. In Brussels, the American president would humiliate the European leaders. Merkel among them. An account of that very unusual event, which I had heard myself and which many years later would be published in the media, says that Trump “held the NATO meeting hostage” for nearly two hours, demanding that countries pay what they owed if they wanted the United States not to withdraw. It clearly captures the German-American disagreement. Trump would even call Germany “a captive of Russia” because of its energy dependence. His demand that Germany withdraw from Nord Stream 2 was also rejected. This was another development in a long pro-Russian policy, whose thread began with Chancellor G. Schroeder and was still continuing.
In August, American support for a final agreement between Kosovo and Serbia had not yet been made public, but Merkel made sure that Germany’s opposition was clear. At a press conference with Denis Zvizdić, chairman of the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a state that Russia needs every bit as much as Germany does, she opposed redrawing borders in the Balkans and defended the “territorial integrity” of Balkan states.
4.
“Go, Hashim.” It was the desperate cry of a man who hoped a court would give him what he had been unable to win himself. Neither the war. Nor the peace. Nor independence. None of it. Many of those who today shed crocodile tears and demand the impossible joined in this cry, which resembles more a betrayal of the people to whom they belong, because along with Hashim, it could be read between the lines, the whole KLA was being called to trial.
It will soon be six years since he went. And Albin Kurti has been prime minister for almost as many days. The discussion or debate, as those who take the word literally (battuere: to strike) like to call it, and who give their vocal cords more of a workout than they do their minds, about his record as prime minister could be long and is certainly contentious. However, there is no question that he, because he said so himself, has accepted that an association of municipalities—or, as he used to prefer to call it, a Zajednica—should be established. It can also be argued that the Ohrid Annex will turn into autonomy for the Serbs of the north, whose documents from the parallel structures he internationalized, and to whom he enabled—not only them, but official Belgrade as well—the fulfillment of their longstanding dream: the demographic reshaping of Kosovo.
This transformation, or perhaps disfigurement or mutilation, of a man who, while out of power, swore that he would speak with Serbia only after it met a string of conditions, but who, as soon as he became head of government, hurried so much to meet and come to an understanding with “the chauvinist Aleksandar Vučić” that he often stumbled over the bodies of Mon Balaj, Arben Xheladini and Astrit Dehari, who are no longer alive, for their ideals and the whims of their leader, seems strange. But viewed from another perspective, the wonder lies not so much in his metamorphosis as in the willingness to believe him even after it had become an eyesore.
Quarrelsomeness and boastfulness are general traits of Balkan peoples. Especially of their leaders, that is, their political leaders. Albanians are no exception. Quarrels that have ended in beatings and killings, and boasts that have reached the point of self-deification, are well known among Albanian leaders, particularly over the last three decades. Nevertheless, it is difficult to find another who has boasted and quarreled with everyone and about everything as much as Albin K. has over these six years. With his own people and with foreigners, whom at times he tried so hard to “leave speechless” with his sensationalist rhetoric and a whole arsenal of statistical distortions, only to end up looking just as ridiculous, if not more so, than he did in that “interview” with two Russian pranksters. His self-praise seems surreal when one sees the international isolation, poverty, departure of young people, and lack of hope in the country.
5.
Once the trial entered its final phase, the most contradictory reports began to emerge. All manner of speculation. Everyone will be released. No one will be released. Others said two would be released and two others convicted. That only one would be released. That the Americans would not leave the KLA in the lurch. Gradually, the wish to see them free had begun circulating as news. You heard it from others and, for a moment, forgot that you might have said it yourself only moments earlier.
A week before the verdict was announced, Pristina was decked in red and black. The KLA, which for a time had been judged old-fashioned, was everywhere. In squares and homes. In cars. On the clothes of the old and the young. But what gave you the most hope was seeing it worn by children. The KLA had won the past. Now it was winning the future. This was the message Kosovo’s children were sending to the world.
Despite the hope, nervousness was everywhere. Suspicion and distrust of “foreign justice,” always present, have begun to grow among Kosovo Albanians. The older ones, who remember the trials of Ramush Haradinaj and Fatmir Limaj and their comrades, try to explain to the younger ones what happened then, how the prosecution behaved, what the judges were like. And so, along with that heavy shadow remembered from two decades ago, The Hague had returned to everyday conversation.
When Ch. Smith began the hearing on September 16, Hashim Thaçi, Kadri Veseli, Jakup Krasniqi and Rexhep Selimi had spent 2,141 days and a few hours in pretrial detention. Nearly half of that time, before any indictment had even been issued against them. It should have been their hour. And for a little while, as the judge explained that they had found no basis for the charge of crimes against humanity (what a surprise!), it seemed so. But, as if afraid he was exonerating them of everything, he hurried to move on to the war crimes charge.
The ugliness in his words began to emerge when he tried to link the war to liberate and make the country independent with the so-called “establishment of political and institutional control,” as a common goal of equal importance, not only for the accused but for the KLA General Staff as well, as a “Joint Criminal Enterprise.” This vile recycling of the prosecution’s claims, besides being an attempt to stain and smear the liberation war with the blood of victims, was a necessary precondition for what came next. 25 years in prison for Hashim Thaçi. The same for Jakup Krasniqi. 18 years in prison for Kadri Veseli. And 13 for Rexhep Selimi.
Hiding behind literary expressions such as “faces covered in blood,” “nails pulled out” and “broken teeth,” and especially by provoking emotion with the phrase “imprisoned children and mothers,” since he had no support in facts, truths or evidence for delivering that utterly absurd verdict, Judge Smith tried to portray as ordinary criminals those whom the Albanian people, and former political and military leaders of the great powers of the time, know as liberators.
The reaction was immediate. Those following the verdict from Pristina’s squares, after initially getting the address wrong, began marching toward the EULEX offices. Further protests were announced. Indeed, things went so far that people called for the court to be abolished.
Only those expected to say something remained silent. A graveyard silence in the government. In the presidency. In parliament. After several hours, Albin K. remembered to say a few words. Dry phrases. “Specific charges and actions were tried,” he says at the end of his address, adding that they “cannot condemn the reason the KLA was born, nor tarnish it.” So the impetus cannot be condemned, but the journey toward freedom can?! This man’s lack of responsibility is shocking. Dangerous, even.
Albania’s reaction makes you even more angry. “Shame,” Edi Rama, prime minister of Albania “and the Albanians,” wrote on Facebook. Shame on you, Prime Minister, for not saying even two words about the century-long sentences handed down to those four men who dared to fight to create the second Albanian state. Shame on you for never tiring of speaking for two or three hours at party council meetings and finding time to argue in Facebook comments with all sorts of characters, but being unable to devote even five minutes to some of the names of Kosovo Albanian freedom.
The invisible and, until now, intractable knot binding the reactions of the leaders of the two Albanian states is the same one on which Hashim Thaçi’s fate, and that of the entire liberation war along with it, was hung. His removal from the plane as he was flying to Washington to sign the agreement with Serbia is connected as much to Albin K. and autonomy for the Serbs of the north as it is to the encirclement and muzzling of E. Rama. It may explain the political moves of the Rama-Kurti duo, and even earlier dynamics that involved Thaçi and Vučić as well as them.
Ah, yes. Richard Grenell also reacted, the man who, at the time the indictment against Hashim Thaçi was being prepared—which, although it had not yet been reviewed, became public on June 24—had been head of 18 U.S. intelligence agencies. Speaking from the oblivion of the Trump administration (parenthetical note: it is hard not to recall the U.S.-Russia-Iran triangle), he urged Kosovo’s lawmakers to abolish the court, in other words to ensure those men remained in prison. The Quint, or the group of five states with the greatest influence in Kosovo, meanwhile called for justice to be left to the justice system. In other words, let us leave them there with their sentences, where they are. In The Hague.
The thousands of people who fill Pristina’s squares day and night think differently. A song that has become a rallying cry for the unceasing days and nights of protest, and says: Kosovo, raise your voice, tell the whole world; your sons have but one name, the name of liberators—expresses the dual temporality better than anything else. It is a call that carries the pain of the past and the hopes of the future, and is addressed above all to the leaders of the country. Every one of them. It asks us to stand firm. To fight. To restore old friendships and create new ones. Above all, it is a promise to ourselves and to one another that this country’s freedom is beyond price.














